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Abstract 
 
When Oregon voters passed the property tax limitation initiative, Measure 5, and 
the state legislature enacted school reform under the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st 
Century during the 1990-91 school year, the trajectory of the public schooling in the state 
changed significantly.  After Oregon’s tax revolt, the state legislature also enacted 
legislation that equalized school funding throughout the state.  The combination of 
equalization and the Measure 5 step-down to the $5 per $1000 tax limitation led to a 
decrease in statewide school funding over the decade.  Many wealthy urban districts 
experienced years of budget cuts, while rural districts received additional funding.  
Despite differences in school funding, teachers emphasized the importance of student 
teacher relationships for teaching and learning.  This thesis traces the history, passage, 
and implementation of these pieces of legislation and evaluates the impact of school 
funding and school reform, two simultaneous but uncoordinated movements, on the 
school system in the state.   
Through historical research and oral history interviews with teachers from the 
large urban district, Portland Public School, and the small rural district, Nyssa School 
District, this thesis demonstrates that teachers experienced school reform similarly.  
When school reform implementation relied upon teachers’ collaboration to align, 
develop, and assess curriculum, teachers embraced change.  However, when school 
reform shifted from outcome-based to standards-based, teachers disengaged from the 
reform process.  They rejected reform when standardized testing drove the curriculum, 
was deemed irrelevant to the lives of their students, utilized inauthentic assessment, did 
 ii 
not treat teachers as professionals, and disregarded teachers’ knowledge and skills.  
Teachers viewed their profession as a craft and disagreed with a business model of 
schools.  Taken together, however, school funding and school reform led to a more 
uniform school system centralized by the state.    
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Introduction 
 
Two distinct forces collided during the 1990-91 school year to change the 
trajectory of public schools in Oregon, the tax revolt and school reform.  Each emerged 
out of a national movement and went into effect at the same time in the state, producing 
major changes in Oregon public schools.  Although these movements were not 
coordinated with each other, when teachers walked into their classrooms in the fall of 
1991, they faced the impacts of both the tax revolt and school reform at once. 
Together, property tax limitation and school reform centralized control over 
schools at the state level.  Both garnered public support because of their personal, 
idealistic appeal—lower property taxes in the case of the tax revolt, and better schools in 
the case of school reform.  By capturing public support, the combination replaced local 
autonomy with state management of public schools.   
While experts, officials, professional associations, and the public debated the 
merits of the tax revolt and school reform at the state and national level, they left out of 
the conversation those most affected: teachers and administrators.  Determining how 
these two movements affected schools and classrooms in Oregon during the 1990s 
requires an examination of both movements.  One without the other obscures the changes 
schools faced.  However, previous researchers—experts on public finance or education—
have failed to look at the simultaneous impact of both movements on schools at the 
ground level.1   
                                                
1 For research on the tax revolt, see David O Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in 
California (Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1985); Isaac William Martin 
and Jack Citrin, eds., After the Tax Revolt: California’s Proposition 13 Turns 30 (Institute of Governmental 
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The tax revolt and school reform compounded to shift schooling in Oregon in 
terms of the structure of its funding and curriculum.  This makeover produced much more 
centralized public schools.  Those seeds planted over twenty year ago have blossomed 
into today’s unstably funded, anonymous, uniform system grounded in standardized 
testing.  While teachers and schools used standardized tests to inform instruction in the 
1990s, today students must pass tests in language arts, writing, math, and science in order 
to graduate.  The content of those tests significantly drives the curriculum.  Local voice, 
power, and autonomy suffer in favor of state centralized control, leaving a fundamental 
question: has this shift toward uniformity and centralization benefited students and 
learning? 
The changes in public schools during the 1990s merits investigation because it 
mirrors the challenges schools face today: higher expectations in a time of financial 
constraint.  To that end, examining the effects of the tax revolt and school funding on 
classrooms at the ground level offers us lessons for the present. 
 
The tax revolt in Oregon, Measure 5, led to adverse effects on public schools.  
Influenced by supply-side economics and burdened by ever-increasing property taxes, 
voters hoped to have it all when they passed Measure 5 in 1990.  They assumed that the 
                                                                                                                                            
Studies Press, 2009); Isaac William Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax 
Transformed American Politics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008); David N. Figlio, “Did 
the ‘Tax Revolt’ Reduce School Performance?,” Journal of Public Economics 65, no. 3 (September 1997): 
245–69, doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00015-7; David N Figlio, “Short-Term Effects of a 1990s-Era 
Property Tax Limit: Panel Evidence on Oregon’s Measure 5,” National Tax Journal. 51, no. 1 (1998): 55; 
For research on school reform, see Diane Ravitch, National Standards in American Education: A Citizen’s 
Guide (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995); Diane Ravitch, Left Back: A Century of Failed 
School Reforms (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Gary B Nash, Charlotte A Crabtree, and Ross E 
Dunn, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past (New York: A.A. Knopf  : Distributed 
by Random House, 1997).  
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property tax limitation would force the legislature to act and pass an alternative revenue 
source to balance the Oregon tax structure.  Despite Governor Barbara Roberts’ best 
efforts, however, the legislature failed to act, leaving an unstable system to sustain 
government services.  After that debacle, the state had no means to replace funds lost to 
schools because of the tax limitation, despite the mandate in the measure to do so.  Voters 
also realized that, by limiting property taxes, the primary finance mechanism for public 
schools, responsibility for funding schools would transfer to the state.  Voters hoped this 
shift would result in equalization across the state, ensuring that all students had parity in 
school funding.  In 1991, the legislature passed the Senate Bill 814, creating the school 
funding equalization formula.   
Equalization combined with the tax limitation created a system of interconnected 
winners and losers.  Formerly wealthy urban districts watched their funding decrease 
over the decade as the state redistributed dollars to poorer, mostly rural districts, which 
saw an increase in funding.  Driven by the goals of school reform, urban districts cut 
courses down to a skeleton, while rural districts expanded to create practically identical 
course offerings.  This resulted in a more uniform school system centralized under the 
state Oregon Department of Education.   
Another major way these changes manifested was class size.  In urban districts 
class size increased over the 1990s to the upper 20s-low 30s, while rural districts 
managed to reduce classes to below 20.  Regardless, teachers from both urban and rural 
schools understood the value of smaller class size for strong teacher student relationships.  
In fact, research also demonstrated that lower class size improved teaching and learning 
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for both students and teachers.  Consequently, while school funding tied together urban 
and rural districts, it affected districts differently. 
At the same time that Measure 5 transformed school funding statewide, the 
curriculum underwent a metamorphosis through the passage in 1991 of the Oregon 
Educational Act for the 21st Century.  The act redesigned the education system around the 
ideas of outcome-based education, creating the Certificate of Initial Mastery (CIM) and 
Certificate of Advanced Mastery (CAM).  While teachers across the state worked 
together to negotiate these changes in their teaching, the controversy over outcomes 
versus standards exploded.  In 1995, the legislature revised the act shifting it from 
outcome-based to standards-based education.  This move further centralized power at the 
state level by mandating standardized testing. 
While changes resulting from school funding affected districts differently because 
of the relative wealth of urban and rural schools, teachers across the state reacted to the 
reform in similar ways because of their shared values, as oral history interviews of 
teachers demonstrated.  Despite teacher cynicism that the state did not sufficiently fund 
the changes necessitated by the reform, and that CIM and CAM might become yet 
another teaching fad, teachers overall embraced the initial outcome based reform model 
passed in the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century.  They welcomed 
collaboration, curriculum alignment, common language, uniform rubrics, and teacher-led 
professional development.   Teachers appreciated the professionalism afforded them and 
effectively began to implement the reform.  Teachers reacted positively because the 
reform aligned with their deeply held values; they saw teaching as a craft and valued the 
autonomy and trust demonstrated when encouraged to work together to create lessons and 
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units that incorporated clear expectations, project-based learning, authentic assessment, 
and strong student teacher relationships.  This worked because the state used a top-down 
bottom-up strategy to implement school reform. 
However, when the CIM and CAM shifted from outcome to standards based after 
a 1995 revision of the law, teachers rejected the change.  They found outside experts 
brought in for professional development to be ineffective and a waste of time and money.  
They objected to the stronger emphasis on testing because it narrowed the curriculum, 
promoted inauthentic assessment, was irrelevant to the lives of their students, and 
encouraged teaching to the test.  Teachers decried the elimination of electives and 
vocational programs as a result of standardization, which directly contradicted the goals 
of the CAM.  Teachers emphasized the importance of student opportunities to try out new 
things, to engage in elective courses in which they find passion, and to learn to act as 
citizens in their communities.  On the whole, teachers rejected the business influence on 
schools.  As Franklin High School (Portland, Oregon) English teacher Manuel Mateo 
emphasized, “I think they were losing sight of what the mission of education was.  For 
me, the mission of education, or the business of education, is not business.”2  In general, 
teachers saw the purpose of education as more than economic; they aimed to mold human 
beings.  As a result of the tax revolt and school reform, Oregon’s education system 
shifted to an economically driven uniform system controlled by the state. 
Despite differences in district funding, teachers shared similar experiences 
because they defined their profession in similar ways.  Mateo remarked, “I'm going to try 
to be as humanistic, and helpful, and caring, and nurturing as possible.  …I am not an 
                                                
2 Manuel Mateo, Oral History Interview of Manuel Mateo, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording, 
January 29, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections. 
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assembly-line worker.  I work on my craft, and it is a craft, and it is a profession.”3   
While very willing to adapt, change, and improve their teaching, teachers opposed 
mandated changes that contradicted their values and beliefs.  Both the urban and rural 
teachers whom I interviewed shared this perspective. 
 
Chapter one traces the tax revolt movement from its origin in California through 
the aftermath of the passage of Measure 5 in Oregon.  Beginning in 1978 with 
Proposition 13 in California, the tax revolt emerged from a national movement to limit 
skyrocketing property taxes.  Following the passage of Proposition 13, copycat ballot 
measures spread like wildfire across the country.  It took Oregonians until 1990 to be 
primed for a similar property tax limitation, but when voters reached the point where 
property taxes soared and satisfaction with government services evaporated, voters 
passed Measure 5 52% to 48%.  The first chapter contrasts the arguments in favor and 
against Measure 5 and follows the drama of the campaign.  The chapter evaluates voters’ 
assumptions in passing the tax limitation and whether those assumptions came to fruition.   
Chapter one also follows the long-term consequences of Measure 5 on the school 
system and determines how school funding transformed across the state.  Prior to 
Measure 5, local property taxes had been the primary method for funding schools, but 
after its passage, that responsibility shifted to the state level.  In charge of funding 
schools, the state could no longer tolerate funding discrepancies between wealthy and 
poor districts.  State legislators passed the school fund equalization formula in 1991, 
which aimed to distribute school funds equitably to districts. By 1991-92, the method for 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
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funding changed from locally determined property taxes to state distributed equalized 
funds.   
At the same time school funding shifted the structure of schooling in Oregon, 
another movement, school reform, transformed the curriculum within classrooms.  
Chapter two follows the school reform movement put in motion by the publication of  A 
Nation at Risk in 1983, which aimed to craft a system with more uniform expectations 
that could be responsive to the needs of a global economy.  Utilizing new research in the 
1980s from cognitive science about how students learn, two competing school reform 
movements emerged: outcome-based education and the standards movement.  Proponents 
of outcome-based education believed in creating outcomes through which students 
demonstrated their learning on performance based assessments and portfolios.  In 1990 a 
coalition of education researchers and politicians published a national report titled 
America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages!, grounded in the principles of outcome-
based education.  America’s Choice became the model for the Oregon Educational Act 
for the 21st Century, introduced to the Oregon legislature by Representative Vera Katz 
(D-Portland), who also served on the board of trustees of the commission that had 
produced America’s Choice.  Chapter two examines the origins, implementation, and 
revision of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century.  It considers Oregon’s 
experience with school reform in relation to the national context.   
Finally, chapter two examines the controversy between outcome-based education 
and the standards movement.  Critics in Oregon and nationwide attacked the perceived 
nebulous nature of outcome-based education.  Meanwhile, based on similar cognitive 
principles, the standards movement gained traction.  In contrast to outcome-based 
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education, advocates of the standards movement argued for clear and precise standards 
that relied on standardized tests to demonstrate students’ achievement.  In 1995, after 
four years experimenting with outcome-based education, the Oregon legislature revised 
the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, shifting it from outcome- to standards-
based.  The pivot towards standards again created a more uniform statewide school 
system.  However, as one teacher emphasized, “Everything became standardized, instead 
of standards-based.”4 
Chapter three analyzes the effects of the tax revolt and school reform on 
classrooms in Oregon.  Using representative case studies from a wealthy urban district, 
Portland Public Schools, and a poor rural district, Nyssa School District, this chapter 
describes the differentiated effects on classrooms of school reform in the context of the 
tax revolt.  State reports, academic studies, newspaper articles, and oral history interviews 
with Portland and Nyssa teachers highlight the consequences when shifting school 
funding and curricular reform converged. 
To uncover how school funding and reform affected the classroom level, I needed 
to go straight to the source: teachers.  I set out to conduct oral history interviews with 
teachers in a rural district and an urban district.  I chose Portland Public Schools as the 
urban district, because it was the most representative of the urban experience: high 
property taxes prior to Measure 5, years of budget cuts during the 1990s, and changing 
student demographics, including a increasing proportion of English-language learners 
(ELL).  I narrowed my sample size to Franklin High School, because its demographics 
most closely matched that of the district as a whole.  I then chose Nyssa School District 
                                                
4 Sandra Childs, Oral History Interview of Sandra Childs, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording, 
February 4, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections. 
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as the rural district, with its one high school, Nyssa High School.  Nyssa gained funds 
from equalization and Measure 5 and also faced a growing population of ELL students.  
Because both districts experienced growth of their ELL populations during the 1990s, 
this acted as a constant in my comparison.   
To connect with teachers that had taught in these schools, I contacted individuals I 
knew that worked in the district, asking them to put me in touch with possible 
interviewees.  After approval from the Portland State University Institutional Review 
Board, I contacted Bill Bigelow, who had taught at Franklin High School for part of the 
decade, and Jill Conant, who taught at Nyssa Elementary School, and, as president of the 
union and longtime Nyssa resident and teacher, knew practically all the high school 
teachers from the 1990s.  Bill and Jill suggested I contact many of the teachers I ended up 
interviewing.  Other participants came from suggestions from my first interviewees.   
In total, I interviewed three teachers who taught at Franklin High School in PPS—
social studies teacher Sandra Childs, business teacher Theresa Hawkins, and language 
arts teacher Manuel Mateo—and three teachers who taught at Nyssa High School in 
Nyssa School District—art teacher David Boyer, science teacher Ken Dickey, and 
language arts teacher Christiane Smith.  I also interviewed the superintendent of Nyssa 
School District during the 1990s, Dennis Savage.  The participants selected represented a 
sampling of disciplines, ages, and backgrounds, and therefore spoke to a wide range of 
issues.  Though a relatively small sample size, my interviews reached a point of 
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saturation, where regardless of the individual, I heard again and again the same 
conclusions.5 
These interviews got to the heart of what happened in classrooms.  To analyze the 
transcripts, I first text-marked printed transcripts and then coded them using Dedoose 
software.  Dedoose was helpful to identify where codes co-occurred and evaluate the 
proportions of various code families.  Dedoose allowed me to abstract common themes 
more easily and draw conclusions from those themes.  This lengthy process allowed me 
to analyze how the tax revolt and school reform impacted classrooms in Oregon during 
the 1990s.  
Measure 5 and equalization of school funding affected individual school districts 
differently in the 1990s.  Wealthy districts such as urban Portland Public Schools suffered 
through a decade of budget cuts, while poor districts like rural Nyssa School District 
welcomed an influx of funds as the state equalized per pupil spending.  Changes in school 
funding affected class size, workload, and the climate of schools.  Resoundingly, in the 
face of increasing class size, teachers reiterated the primacy of the student-teacher 
relationship for effective learning and the difficulty in forging these relationships.  
Overall, because of the new limit placed on property taxes and the instability of the 
Oregon tax structure, which relied upon income taxes, the shift in school funding led 
                                                
5 Ibid.; Theresa Hawkins, Oral History Interview of Theresa Hawkins, interview by Beth Cookler, digital 
recording, February 11, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections; Mateo, Oral History Interview 
of Manuel Mateo; David Boyer, Oral History Interview of David Boyer, interview by Beth Cookler, digital 
recording, February 24, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections; Ken Dickey, Oral History 
Interview of Ken Dickey, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording, February 21, 2014, Portland State 
University Special Collections; Christiane Smith, Oral History Interview of Christiane Smith, interview by 
Beth Cookler, digital recording, February 24, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections; Dennis 
Savage, Oral History Interview of Dennis Savage, interview by Beth Cookler, digital recording, February 
21, 2014, Portland State University Special Collections. 
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statewide to a decrease in per pupil spending.  In short, on average, the state as a whole 
spent more on its schools prior to Measure 5 than it did a decade later. 
The third chapter also assesses the impact of school reform on teachers in Oregon.  
After the passage of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century in 1991, built on the 
principles of outcome-based education, teachers began, often for the first time, to open 
their doors and talk to each other about what students needed to be able to do and 
understand by the end of each course.  Teachers aligned their curriculum and collaborated 
to create projects for students to demonstrate their learning.  Reports, news articles, and 
oral history interviews confirm that teachers embraced this reform as a meaningful 
transformation of schooling.  Despite affirmation by teachers in classrooms, the reform 
failed to gain widespread support because the public viewed outcome-based education as 
vague. 
Consequently, the legislature revised the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st 
Century, moving to a standards-based model in 1995.  Teachers reacted negatively.  
Instead of the collaborative climate of teacher-led curriculum development from the 
outcome-based reform model, this shift to standardized tests led to professional 
development usurped by outside experts.  Constrained by both funding and reform, the 
curriculum narrowed uniformly across the state to include only course offerings 
necessary to comply with the testing.  Increasingly, schools eliminated electives and 
vocational education (and related teaching positions), courses that for many students 
uncovered new passions and motivated them to succeed in school.   
The history of schooling in Oregon over the 1990s illuminates persistent 
challenges facing the public education nationwide over the last three decades.  Patterns 
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initiated by the compound effects of school reform and the tax revolt continue to this day.  
Though new iterations of school reform have followed, such as No Child Left Behind and 
the current Common Core State Standards, Oregon’s school finance structure created 
during the 1990s remains.  Consequently, the instability of an underfunded system 
heavily reliant on income taxes becomes more apparent with each economic recession.  
In this state of decreasing educational funding and increasing standardization, many 
suggest increasing productivity and efficiency are the answer.  In contrast, this thesis 
reiterates the common-sense notion that a good education system depends most on the 
ability of teachers to affect their students.  In fact, teachers want to improve their schools 
and will work hard to do so if allowed to collaborate in translating reforms into the 
language of school.  Obstacles to this goal, such as increasing class size, professional 
development led by outsiders, and standardized testing, negatively affect teachers’ ability 
to reach students.  This research underscores the notion that education is a system based 
on human interaction, which diminishes its success when designed to be a machine. 
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Chapter One: Tax Revolt 
 
Oregonians passed Measure 5, a property tax limitation that shifted school 
funding from the local to state level, by a margin of 52% to 48% on November 6, 1990.1  
Although Measure 5 began a new era in the history of taxation, legislation, and education 
for Oregon, it continued a long tradition of tax revolts at the state level.  Property taxes 
had long been used to fund local schools.   Beginning in the 1970s however, a movement 
towards equalization of school funding combined with rapidly increasing property taxes 
to ignite the tax revolt movement across the United States, beginning with the passage of 
California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. Two underlying causes, increasing property taxes 
and school funding equalization, led to popular support of this movement.  Twelve years 
later, the passage of Measure 5 in Oregon produced unintended consequences for schools 
across the state. 
 
Historical Context of the Tax Revolt 
California’s Proposition 13 passed on June 6, 1978 in a landslide with 65% of the 
vote.  It was the highest recorded voter-turnout for an off-year election in the state’s 
history.2  Written by Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, Proposition 13 amended the state’s 
constitution to limit the property tax to one percent of full cash value, restrict increases in 
the property tax to two percent a year, and require a two-thirds vote of the legislature for 
all new taxes.  The measure also dictated that the base assessment revert back the to 
                                                
1 Barnes C. Ellis, “Officials Begin to Wrestle with Tax Limit,” The Oregonian, November 8, 1990, Fourth 
edition. 
2 Martin and Citrin, After the Tax Revolt, vii. 
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1975-1976 tax year.3  Supporters represented a wide range of Californians, encompassing 
all income levels, with the greatest support among those earning between $20,000 and 
$30,000; all educational levels, though dropping to only 51% of those with college 
degrees or above; and 55% of Democrats.  Opponents, who represented a mere 35% of 
the vote, included government employees, renters, and a majority of the black 
community.4  Thirty-five years following its passage, Proposition 13 remained popular in 
California.5   
The tax revolt spread like wildfire throughout the country after Proposition 13.  
Though the tax revolt had been brewing throughout the nation with unsuccessful attempts 
to reform the property tax beginning in the early 1970s, after the landslide victory of 
Proposition 13 in California, forty-three states followed suit and passed some form of tax 
relief between 1978 and 1980.6  Ballot initiatives modeled after California became the 
favorite method of tax reformers.7   
The circulation of Proposition 13-like initiatives occurred as a result of common 
contexts within states.  Jack Citrin, political science professor at UC Berkeley and a 
leading expert on Proposition 13, and David O. Sears, professor of social psychology and 
political science at UCLA, found that states that passed tax cuts similar to Proposition 13 
in the late 1970s had two features in common: a high overall tax burden and an electorate 
cynical about the effectiveness of elected officials to manage taxes.8  In the climate of the 
                                                
3 James Ring Adams, Secrets of the Tax Revolt (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), 164. 
4 Ibid., 166. 
5 In a survey conducted in 2008, 57% of California voters would approve the measure if it appeared on the 
ballot today, while only 23% of voters would vote against it.  See Mark DiCamillo, “Californians’ Views of 
Proposition 13 Thirty Years after its Passage,” in Martin and Citrin, After the Tax Revolt, 13. 
6 Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 261. 
7 Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt, 14. 
8 Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 263. 
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late 1970s, the effect of inflation on citizens’ tax burden and distrust in government 
combined to produce a tax revolt across the United States. 
Until the 1990s Oregon was not yet ready for the tax revolt that Proposition 13 
had ignited.  Two tax-cutting initiatives, Measure 11 and Measure 6, failed at the ballot 
box in November 1978.9  As state senator Charles J. Hanlon explained to The Oregonian, 
“Oregon is not California.  Oregon does not enjoy a massive state surplus.”10  This much 
was true.  California’s estimated $7.1 billion surplus gave that state a buffer against the 
immediate impact of Proposition 13’s cuts.11  As Hanlon pointed out, 
Oregon expects a general fund deficit for the 1979-81 biennium of as much as 
$400 million…Oregon has no sales tax…Oregon’s average property tax rate is 2.2 
percent of true cash value, a mere 0.7 percent higher than the rate imposed by 
Jarvis-Gann.  Also, Oregon’s average property tax rate is falling…Finally, 
Oregon has a very effective method of transferring general fund monies into the 
pockets of low-income property taxpayers…Perhaps the major difference between 
California and Oregon is that here the people decide how much they will pay in 
property taxes.12   
 
Because Oregon did not fulfill Sears and Citrin’s prerequisites for a tax revolt—its taxes 
remained at a reasonable level, and Oregonians felt their democratic system was 
responsive to their needs—the measures failed at the ballot box.  But even though 
Oregonians might not have been ready in 1978, California’s experience with Proposition 
13 nonetheless greatly influenced Oregon’s story. 
The national property tax revolt changed the relationship between the government 
and its people.  Journalist Robert Kuttner concluded, “Whatever its origins, the national 
tax revolt sparked by California’s Proposition 13 has assumed the status of political 
                                                
9 “Some States Must Cut,” The Oregonian, November 12, 1978, The Sunday Oregonian edition. 
10 Charles J. Hanlon, “Oregon’s Situation Unlike California’s,” The Oregonian, June 25, 1978, The Sunday 
Oregonian edition. 
11 Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 32–33. 
12 Hanlon, “Oregon’s Situation Unlike California’s.” 
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watershed, conveniently separating the New Deal-Great Society era from a newer, leaner 
period that finds the public far stingier with tax dollars and increasingly skeptical about 
government’s basic competence to solve problems.”13  Beginning with President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal during the Great Depression and continuing through President 
Johnson’s Great Society, taxpayers generally supported government and social programs 
that increased opportunities for citizens to access the American dream.  During this 
period, Americans felt confident in their government to act on behalf of the people to 
better society.  However, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and Nixon’s resignation from 
office in 1974 shattered trust in government.  Faced with ever-increasing property taxes 
resulting from inflation during a period in which wages stagnated, Americans no longer 
trusted that government officials had their constituents’ best interests at heart.  
Proposition 13 bookended a new era in which Americans no longer readily gave way to 
increases in government’s size; instead, citizens expected a more efficient government; in 
fact, they expected the same services for less. 
Table 1 Tax Revolt Timeline 
Timeline 
  
1967 California Assembly Bill 80 standardized property tax collection 
1971 Serrano v. Priest: California Supreme Court decided in favor of school funding 
equalization 
1973 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: United States Supreme Court 
decided states not required to equalize school funding 
1977 California Assembly Bill 65, Serrano compliance, redistributed property taxes to equalize 
school funding 
1971-1978 24 states passed equalization of school funding 
Jun 6, 1978 California’s Proposition 13 passed; Proposition 8 failed 
Nov 7, 1978 Oregon’s tax cut initiatives, Measures 6 and 11, failed 
1978-1980 43 states pass tax cut initiatives following Proposition 13 
Nov 6, 1990 Oregon’s property tax limitation, Measure 5, passed 
1991 Oregon Senate Bill 814 created the equalization formula 
  
                                                
13 Robert Kuttner, Revolt of the Haves: Tax Rebellions and Hard Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1980), 7. 
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Citrin concluded, “There is no great mystery about a primary cause of the tax 
revolt.  It was higher taxes.”14  High property taxes stemmed from a change in the process 
of tax collection by the assessor.  Before 1967, property tax collection included informal 
tax privileges not codified in law, such as fractional assessment.  Fractional assessment 
“refers to the custom of taxing people on a fraction of the value of their taxable 
property.”15  Because the value of a property is determined hypothetically, except for the 
rare year that a property is actually sold, the practice of fractional assessment is hard to 
trace.  Additionally, because local homeowners elected local tax assessors, these officials 
often exchanged favorable property assessments for campaign contributions, votes, and 
even bribes.  Even homeowners who did not actively engage tax assessors benefitted.  
Many assessors copied the assessment roles of a property from year to year, ignoring 
changes in the market.16  Consequently, most homeowners paid property taxes only on a 
small fraction of their home’s value. 
UC San Diego sociology professor Isaac William Martin, who studied the causes 
and effects of the tax revolt in California after the passage of Proposition 13, argued that 
tax privileges like fractional assessment belonged to an ever-growing American welfare 
state benefitting middle and upper class property owners.  “We now see [the American 
welfare state] as middling in size and generosity—but as unusually reliant on tax 
expenditures that favor middle- and upper-income groups.”17  From this perspective, it is 
                                                
14 Martin and Citrin, After the Tax Revolt, 3. 
15 Martin, The Permanent Tax Revolt, 6. 
16 Ibid., 6–7. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
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not hard to understand how the anger at increasing property taxes following 1967 led to 
the tax revolt of Proposition 13. 
Assembly Bill (A.B.) 80, passed by the California legislature in 1967, 
standardized the discretionary collection of taxes by the assessor.  It required immediate 
reassessment of all property at twenty-five percent of market value followed by 
reassessments every two or three years to keep the ratio intact.  Moreover, before the 
passage of this statute, commercial properties had been customarily assessed at a higher 
ratio of market value and therefore assumed a greater burden of property tax revenue.  By 
standardizing both housing and commercial property at twenty-five percent, a greater 
burden fell on homeowners for property tax revenue.18  At the same time, the economic 
picture in California changed: the California housing market boomed and so did inflation.  
Standardization, the housing boom, and inflation combined to create a rapid increase in 
property taxes.  As Sears and Citrin noted, “numerous homeowners thus faced abruptly 
higher property tax bills without a corresponding rise in their incomes.”19 
 
Oregon’s Measure 5 
By 1990, Oregon was primed for a tax revolt.  Since 1968, Oregonians had 
rejected nineteen tax reform or school financing measures.20  However, in the 1970s and 
1980s, property tax rates kept climbing.  For example, in 1978 Portland taxed residential 
property at $24.32 per $1000 of assessed value of a property; by 1990 the rate had 
                                                
18 Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 19–20. 
19 Ibid., 22. 
20 Barnes C. Ellis, “Measure 5 Oregon’s Property Tax Tangle,” The Oregonian, October 21, 1990, Fourth 
edition. 
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jumped to almost $35 per $1000, and the assessed value of property had doubled.21  
Homeowners consequently felt the pang of both an increased assessed value of their 
home and an increase in the tax rate.  By 1990, a groundswell finally garnered enough 
support to pass a property tax limitation, Measure 5.   
Don McIntire, a health club owner from Gresham, founded and chaired the 
organization that filed the Measure 5 petition, Protect Oregon Property Society (POPS).  
The Gresham Outlook attributed much of the success of the ballot initiative to McIntire’s 
leadership.  Vern White, research director of the non-profit Oregon Tax Research, which 
provided much of the data and analysis to POPS, remarked that McIntire, “was the chief 
petitioner, the principal spokesperson, and the spark.”22  McIntire’s charisma shined 
through in tv spots, interviews, and his writings.  He represented a wave of Oregonians 
ready to support a limit on taxes. 
McIntire reasoned that limiting property taxes would repair an ineffective and 
oversized government.  In the first edition of the POPS-published Grassroots Gazette 
newsletter in August of 1989, McIntire proclaimed his frustration with government 
efforts to manage property taxes. 
It should be clear to every Oregon property owner by now that our state 
legislature is not going to do anything responsible to limit property taxes.  We 
have heard promise after promise, session after session, but have seen no 
results…In most areas of our state, property taxes have increased more rapidly 
than any other tax we pay.  Something must be done to limit that growth—
permanently—or most of us are going to be in more serious trouble in the near 
future than we are now, and that’s trouble enough.23 
                                                
21 Barnes C. Ellis, “Support Aired for Tax Limitation Plan,” The Oregonian, September 3, 1990, Fourth 
edition. 
22 Robin Franzen, “The Man Behind the Measure,” The Gresham Outlook, November 10, 1990, sec. 1A, 
The Ballot Measure Archive Project, 1959-2007, Series 46, Portland State University Special Collections.  
(Hereafter BMAP) 
23 Don McIntire, “Growth of Property Taxes Must Be Limited,” Grassroots Gazette, August 1990, (In 
BMAP). 
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McIntire saw the government as dominated by a lazy bureaucracy without the political 
will to fight inertia.  From his perspective, Oregonians suffered because of the inability of 
their elected officials to act, the results of which manifested in wasteful spending and 
government programs of questionable value.  However, for all his rhetoric, McIntire and 
his supporters knew the limits of their platform.  In a retrospective article in the 
Statesman Journal in 1995, petitioner Thomas Dennehy commented, “We’re not grenade 
throwers.  We never wanted to destroy government.  We did need to reduce the growth of 
government.”24   
To do so, McIntire, Dennehy, and George Choban worked to file an initiative 
petition to restrict that growth by limiting property taxes.  The movement to put what was 
to become Measure 5 on the November ballot had begun.  In Grassroots Gazette, 
McIntire pressed, “We must—once again—put the matter in the hands of our citizens.  
Then, we are convinced, we will get results.”25  He urged supporters to go out into their 
communities and collect valid registered-voter signatures for the petition.  “We will need 
87,000 valid signatures by July 6, 1990.  In excess of 100,000 signatures are needed to be 
sure we have enough registered voters’ signatures.”26  On an undated handwritten ledger 
paper supporters tallied petition signatures by county, by their count totaling 116,371.  
The Portland metro area counties accounted for the most significant totals on this 
unofficial tally.  On 3,446 pages, Multnomah County accounted for 39,448 signatures of 
registered voters; Clackamas contained 14,398 signatures on 1,362 pages; and 
                                                
24 John Henrikson, “Measure 5’s Bottom Line,” Statesman Journal, November 12, 1995, Sunday edition, 
sec. 3B, (In BMAP). 
25 McIntire, “Growth of Property Taxes Must Be Limited.” 
26 Don McIntire, “Petition Signing Going Well, But We Need Your Help!,” Grassroots Gazette, August 
1989, (In BMAP). 
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Washington County tallied 11,546 signatures on 1,219 pages.  Outside of the Portland 
metro area, Lane County added a significant number of signatures, 12,838 on 968 
pages.27  These four counties are some of the most heavily populated areas in Oregon, but 
none voted reliably for Republican issues such as tax limitations.  In the 1988 presidential 
election two years earlier, both Multnomah and Lane Counties voted for the Democratic 
candidate, Michael Dukakis.  Though Clackamas and Washington Counties swung for 
the Republican candidate, George H.W. Bush, they did so only by slim margins.28  This 
suggested that Protect Oregon Property Society hit upon an issue popular with 
Oregonians across the political spectrum, the high rate of property taxes. 
Outside of metropolitan Portland and Lane County, Measure 5 appealed to voters 
as well.  In a letter to the editor of The Argus Observer, Jay Rucker of Vale, in eastern 
Oregon, wrote,  
The problem is real.  People are really hurt by these taxes—all ages, all groups.  
Young people pay more in taxes on their monthly mortgage payments than they 
do on principal.  Older citizens find that they must pay hundred or thousands of 
dollars per year to live in their own home, even if it’s paid for.  In lieu of the ever-
expanding programs demanding more and more from us each year, I agree with 
those who say stop, and will support Measure 5.29 
 
Voters reacted not only to their own individual tax circumstance, but also to the notion 
that Oregon trailed behind the majority of states that had passed tax limitation measures 
after Proposition 13.30  By 1990, Oregonians were ready to pass a tax limitation measure; 
                                                
27 “Petition Signature Tally” (Protect Oregon Property Society, 1990), (In BMAP). 
28 “County Breakdown,” The Oregonian, November 10, 1988, Fourth edition. 
29 Jay Rucker, “Letter to the Editor: Measure 5,” Argus Observer, October 31, 1990. 
30 Sears and Citrin, Tax Revolt, 261. 
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on May 8, 1990, Don McIntire, George Choban, and Thomas Dennehy filed the petition 
for Ballot Measure 5.31 
Learning from failed initiatives in the past, the petitioners wrote a smarter ballot 
measure.  Measure 5 aimed to amend Article XI of the state’s constitution to limit 
property taxes to $15 per $1000 of assessed real market value.  However, in contrast to 
previous ballot initiatives, Measure 5 separated taxes into two categories, one for public 
schools and another for all other government services.  According to the measure, 
property taxes for schools would ultimately be limited to $5 per $1000 on assessed real 
market value, and the remaining $10 per $1000 would be allocated to local government 
services such as police, fire, and libraries.  By separating public schools, petitioners 
hoped to protect school funding by not competing with other government services.  The 
second innovation was the implementation of the initiative over five years.  By ratcheting 
down the property tax limitation slowly by $2.50 per $1000 each year, the petitioners 
designed the measure to blunt the full impact of the constriction until 1996-97.  Other 
components of Measure 5 included the exemption of capital bonds from the limitation, 
the continual readjustment of proportions for local revenues so as not to exceed the cap of 
$10 per $1000 for government services, and a mandate for state replacement funds for the 
public school system during the first five years.32  The petitioners, Don McIntire, George 
Choban, and Thomas Dennehy, succeeded in crafting a winning measure. 
 
                                                
31 Oregon State Legislature, Constitution of Oregon, 2011, http://www.leg.state.or.us/bills_laws/. 
32 Don McIntire, George Choban, and Thomas P. Dennehy, “State Constitutional Limit on Property Taxes 
for Schools, Government Operations” (Oregon Secretary of State Elections Division, November 6, 1990), 
(In BMAP). 
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Table 2 Measure 5 Implementation 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TAXES 
For Each $1000 of Property’s Real Market Value 
Fiscal Year School System Other than Schools 
1991-1992 $15.00 $10.00 
1992-1993 $12.50 $10.00 
1993-1994 $10.00 $10.00 
1994-1995 $7.50 $10.00 
1995-1996 $5.00 $10.00 
and thereafter   
 
In addition to the chorus of “wasteful government” and “ineffective leaders,” a 
number of other persuasive arguments emerged in favor of Measure 5.  The primary 
argument, that property taxes were too high, Patricia Fairchild, Executive Director of 
Oregonians for Cost-Effective Government, presented in the election’s Voters’ Pamphlet.  
“Property taxes have outstripped many homeowners’ ability to pay.  Taxes have 
increased more than our pay and retirement checks.  In the last twenty years, property 
taxes grew at twice the rate of inflation.”33  This argument led the measure’s support by 
69% of voters in a poll conducted by The Oregonian in September.34   
An economic argument embedded in the measure reflected the rhetoric of the 
Reagan-era supply-side economics.  This argument reasoned that the state’s coffers 
would continue to grow, though at a modest rate, after the passage of Measure 5.  A 
prosperous economy would make up the difference as the limitation was implemented 
over five years.  Petitioner Dennehy argued in the Voters’ Pamphlet that, “Given the five-
year phase-in of the limits of Measure 5, the normal economic growth of the State will be 
sufficient to absorb the impacts of Measure 5 and still allow modest growth in existing 
                                                
33 “Oregon Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, November 6, 1990” (Oregon Secretary of State Elections 
Division, October 16, 1990), 36, Oregon Voters Pamphlet Project, Oregon State Library, 
http://library.state.or.us/repository/2010/201003011350161/ORVPGenMari1990.pdf. 
34 Ellis, “Support Aired for Tax Limitation Plan.” 
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State programs.”  While Measure 5 placed a cap on property tax rates, it did not place a 
cap on the growth of property assessments.  Assuming property values rise over time, 
state property tax revenue would increase regardless of the cap.  “Here’s going to be the 
big surprise,” McIntire predicted.  “After we get to the lowest limits, they’re going to find 
that property tax revenues keep increasing, and the citizens are still protected by a 
predictable limit, but they’re going to be paying more property taxes.  You can’t avoid 
that, because the value will increase.”35  Additionally, the money property owners saved 
because of lower taxes would be reinvested in the economy, leading to greater incomes, 
and in turn greater state income tax revenue.  Frank Eisenzimmer, POPS Treasurer, 
explained, 
Passage of Measure 5 will improve the economy in other ways.  Some of the 
money that is saved by property owners will be funneled into the marketplace.  
This will create a higher demand for products and services, which will equate to 
more jobs.  Some of the money will be placed in savings, which can be loaned to 
start new businesses, or purchase homes.  Again, more jobs.  That means the 
General Fund will grow, thereby providing more money for funding schools.36 
 
This justification of tax cuts as a method to create jobs and benefit the state evolved from 
the sweeping influence of the Republican economic policies of the Reagan 
administration.37  Just two years after the conclusion of Reagan’s presidency, and with 
his Vice President, George H.W. Bush, in office, supply-side economic theories 
permeated mainstream society.  Consequently, its use as an argument in favor of Measure 
5 was both familiar and logical to many voters. 
                                                
35 Ellis, “Measure 5 Oregon’s Property Tax Tangle.” 
36 Frank Eisenzimmer in “Oregon Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, November 6, 1990,” 34. 
37 William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 90–94. 
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Another influential argument revolved around school funding.  Up until this point, 
Oregon based the level of public school funding through local property tax collection.  
Measure 5 shifted the responsibility to finance public schools from local property taxes to 
the state’s general fund and the income tax.  Proponents argued that a yes vote on 
Measure 5 “is the first logical step towards fairness in education.  Our children and 
teachers are being held hostage due to the overdependence on property taxes to finance 
education.  Property owners are voting down school levies because they cannot afford to 
carry more of the burden.  Passage of Measure 5 will force the legislators to finance 
education from the General Fund.”38  Many Oregonians felt incapable of funding their 
local schools at the level they deserved and therefore supported Measure 5.  The school 
fairness argument also allowed Democrats to cross the aisle with a clear conscious and 
vote for the property tax limitation on behalf of equitable school funding. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of the broad base of support Measure 5 captured 
was the endorsement of Mark Zusman, editor of Willamette Week, a liberal weekly paper 
in Portland.  In two articles, published on August 23 and August 30, 1990, Zusman 
endorsed Measure 5.  In Grassroots Gazette, McIntire commented, “Zusman’s well-
reasoned analysis of the problem and the solution not only shocked the Education 
Establishment; it came as a major surprise to us too.  Willamette Week is the most 
ultraliberal publication in the state.”39  Zusman argued that the ballot measure surpassed 
previous ones because of the petitioners’ changes to its structure: separating schools from 
other government services and the five-year implementation plan.  “The retooling has 
                                                
38 Frances Hyson in “Oregon Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, November 6, 1990,” 35. 
39 Don McIntire, “‘It’s Time to Support Measure 5’ So Says Willamette Week (!),” Grassroots Gazette, 
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worked: Measure 5 is the most sensible attempt of its kind.”40  Zusman contended that the 
current school financing system was disastrous and that Measure 5 would be a welcome 
change.  “The enactment of this proposal would be the first step in a reform of Oregon’s 
archaic system of school finance.  It’s a system so dependent on local property taxes—
and therefore on the economic bases of individual districts—that it makes a mockery of 
the ideal of an equitable educational system.”41  Zusman countered that the subsequent 
loss of local control over schools would be worth it in exchange for stabilization of 
school funding.   
Zusman also believed that the property tax limitation would force the legislature 
to develop an alternative revenue source to ensure stable funding for education.  This 
became a popular argument, despite the objections of the petitioners.  “Even if the 
measure does create chaos,” Zusman wrote, “it is a necessary sort of chaos that will 
eventually lead to support for an alternative source of revenue.”  He recognized that it 
was improbable that Oregonians would pass a sales tax.  “This approach has failed 
pathetically over the past 15 years…Oregonians have shown a real reluctance to approve 
one tax at the same time they are reducing another.”42  The petitioners agreed that 
limiting the property tax would not force a sales tax.  “Our legislators might try, as they 
have in the past, but remember, they have asked for a sales tax eight different times and 
the best return they ever got from Oregonians was 29% of the vote!”43  However, there 
                                                
40 Mark Zusman, “The Common Sense of Measure 5,” Willamette Week, August 30, 1990, sec. Editor’s 
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41 Ibid. 
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was a general consensus that Oregonians needed another stable revenue source and that 
Measure 5 would force the legislature to act.   
While the petitioners dispelled the alternative revenue source argument, many 
voters supported Measure 5 on the grounds that it would pressure the legislature to act.  
Even opponents to the measure, such as State Superintendent of Schools Norma Paulus, 
felt that Measure 5 would pressure the legislature to pass an alternative tax.  Paulus 
claimed, “If this measure only dealt with schools I could deal with it by asking the public 
to substitute a sales tax for the property tax we now pay for schools…I urge you to vote 
“no” on Measure 5, and join me next January in a genuine grassroots effort to put state 
priorities in order.”44  In other words, though she did not support Measure 5, she did feel 
it was time to pressure the legislature to push through a sales tax.   
Others, such as the City Club of Portland, predicted that a crisis brought about by 
Measure 5 would not ensure the passage of an alternative revenue source.  “Your 
committee could find no historical basis for believing the Legislature would accomplish 
these difficult tasks to the satisfaction of Oregon voters, and the majority of your 
Committee was not persuaded that creating a crisis would improve the situation.”45  
Nonetheless, many supporters assumed the passage of Measure 5 would pressure the 
Legislature to develop an alternative revenue source that would stabilize school funding. 
Supporters and opponents also disputed the meaning of Paragraph 1, Subsection 5 
of the measure, which concerned the state’s obligation to replace funds lost by schools.  It 
read,   
                                                
44 Norma Paulus, “Letter to Kristin and Craig Flynn,” October 10, 1990, (In BMAP). 
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The Legislative Assembly shall replace from the State’s general fund any revenue 
lost by the public school system because of the limitations of this section.  The 
Legislative Assembly is authorized, however, to adopt laws which would limit the 
total of such replacement revenue plus the taxes imposed within the limitations of 
this section in any year to the corresponding total for the previous year plus 6 
percent.  This subsection applies only during fiscal years 1991-92 through 1995-
96, inclusive.46 
 
While supporters applauded the mandate to replace lost funds through the state’s General 
fund, many noted, “This is language without any teeth.”  Requested by the legislature to 
interpret the measure, Attorney General David Frohnmayer determined that, although the 
measure mandated the state to replace funds, it only required the state to do so for the 
first five years; there was no mandate for the state to allocate any funds to education 
following 1996.  Additionally, according to the text of the measure, replacement funds 
would be capped at a six percent increase over the previous year.  If a school district’s 
expenses increased more than six percent, the state was not obligated to fund this 
additional increase.  The measure also did not require the state to replace funds dollar-
for-dollar to individual districts.  It only required the state to replace the total aggregate 
sum of losses incurred from the limitation on property taxes.  This meant that the state 
could simply relabel Basic School Support Funds already provided to individual school 
districts, producing a net loss of funds to individual districts.47  As the Oregon Education 
Association noted, “Clearly, the Legislature would not devote that much money for 
schools.  The consequences would be sharp drops in their basic school support funds and 
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in funds that have been available for other programs.”48  The bottom line was a net loss of 
school funds. 
Aside from the technicalities of where the funds might come from, the enormity 
of the tax cut alone led many to question the state’s ability to make up the difference.  
Oregon Business Magazine, which opposed Measure 5, wrote, “This would force the 
state to come up with estimated revenues of $857 million in 1991-92, $2.1 billion in 
1993-94, and $3.3 billion in 1996-97, or limit spending by that amount…It is tempting to 
believe that forcing the Legislature to change the Oregon tax structure will result in an 
improvement.  But it is just as likely we could end up with something worse.  Putting a 
gun to someone’s head can usually force him to act, but not always rationally.”49  The 
business community feared the uncertainty that would arise from the unfunded 
replacement mandate and hoped the state would not turn to them to fill that void.   
Opponents also feared that in order to fulfill the replacement mandate, the state 
would raise income taxes.  If so, Measure 5 would ultimately benefit businesses more 
than homeowners.  In the current tax model, 58% of property tax revenue came from 
businesses while 39% came from homeowners.  “Giving 58% of property tax relief to 
commercial property owners and landlords while threatening funding to education, 
police, fire, and other services is a tragic mistake,”50 exclaimed Betty Rademaker, 
President of Oregon Fair Share.  By shifting responsibility to pay for services to the 
state’s general fund and the income tax, savings from the property tax cut would 
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eventually be offset by increases in the income tax, which relied on individuals, not 
businesses.  As Ira Fletcher, President of Oregon AFL-CIO, argued, “Measure 5 looks 
like a tax cut, but it will end up being a tax shift—on to the backs of working 
people…unlike property taxes, income taxes and sales taxes are paid for primarily by 
individuals…Shifting the tax load from the property tax to the sales or income tax may be 
great for businesses and landlords, but it’s a disaster for ordinary working people.”51  In 
other words, opponents argued that Measure 5 was merely a façade that masked unjust 
tax relief for businesses. 
Though a September 1990 Oregonian poll found 69% of voters in favor of 
Measure 5, by October a KATU-TV poll showed that the lead had narrowed to 47% in 
favor, 42% opposed, and 11% undecided.52  Opposition spending and a media blitz 
accounted for the decline in support.  As Election Day neared, opponents spent over 
$900,000 to defeat Measure 5, of which $500,000 came from Oregon Education 
Association.  The Oregonian observed, “It should come as little surprise that the 
measure’s critics include such political heavyweights as Governor Neil Goldschmidt, the 
vast majority of the Legislature, the Oregon Mayors’ Association and the Association of 
Oregon Counties; public employees unions; and civic groups such as the Portland 
Chamber of Commerce and the Association for Portland Progress.” 53  These critics 
argued that deep cuts would choke state and local services, school districts would lose 
local control.  The uncertainty of stable funding was a bad bet for Oregon.  Endorsements 
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published in the Voter’s Pamphlet demonstrated that Measure 5 pitted mobilized citizens 
against the state’s political establishment.   
Table 3 Measure 5 Endorsements 
Measure 5 Endorsements from 1990 Voter’s Pamphlet54 
YES NO 
Protect Our Property Society 
Oregon Homeowner’s Association, Inc. 
Northwest Alliance for Market Equality 
United Citizens, Inc. 
Oregonians for Cost-Effective Government 
Committee for Good Schools and 
Affordable Taxes 
Save Our Children Coalition 
Neil Goldschmidt, Governor of Oregon 
Barbara Roberts, Secretary of State 
Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General 
Norma Paulus, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction-Elect 
Oregon Education Association 
Oregon School Boards Association 
Oregon’s Community College Presidents 
Oregon Library Association 
Oregon Fair Share/Fair Share NPAC 
Oregon Fire Chiefs Association 
Oregon Fire District Directors Association 
Oregon State Fire Fighters Council 
The Oregon Committee 
League of Women Voters of Oregon 
United Seniors of Oregon 
Associated Oregon Industries 
Human Services Coalition of Oregon 
Oregon AFL-CIO  
Communist Party 
 
 
The opponents’ main argument against Measure 5 focused on the cuts that the 
initiative would necessitate.  City governments across the state publicized anticipated 
cuts.  Officials estimated that Measure 5 would cost the City of Portland $37 million, the 
equivalent of a twenty percent across-the-board cut.  The Oregonian reported that “The 
Parks Bureau brochure [wrote] its obituary” after its analysis of Measure 5’s impact.55  
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Mayor Bud Clark lamented that Measure 5 would “stick local government in the eye.”56  
Eastern Oregon Pendleton Mayor Joe McLaughlin claimed Measure 5 would force 
$300,000 from the city’s $5.1 million budget.  “In a place like Portland, that’s a drop in 
the bucket.  In a town this size and that small of a budget, that’s quite a bit.”57   
State officials also cried cuts; by the 1993-95 biennium, they estimated it would 
cost the state an estimated $1.6 billion in replacement funds, which equated to about 
9,600 jobs, or a quarter of all state employees.58   Salem Mayor Tom Neilsen bemoaned, 
“The city will get a triple whammy.  There will be budget cuts.  Secondly, 60 percent of 
state employees are in Salem, and they will add to the reduced work force.  And, if the 
county reduced its criminal justice system, and Salem reduces its crime prevention, 
Salem will see the results.”59  To grab the public’s attention, Mayor Neilsen played upon 
fears that criminals would walk the streets of Salem.  While officials didn’t necessarily 
lie about the severity of the cuts following Measure 5, they certainly used hyperbole to 
their advantage in crafting the opposition campaign.  The drop in the polls suggested, a 
least initially, that “the doomsday deluge,” as The Oregonian called it, had worked. 60 
Cuts to public schools were opponents’ greatest concern.  While many cities 
already taxed below the Measure 5 limit, school funding was a different story.61   Those 
school districts that taxed above $5 per $1000 did so because their citizens had voted for 
that level of taxation and used the funds for an array of programs.  For example, Portland 
Public Schools (PPS) provided social programs including health care, after-school care, 
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drug therapy, counseling, and job training, among others.  PPS had by far the state’s 
highest concentration of high needs students, such as students with learning disabilities, 
students for whom English was not their first language, and students from impoverished 
homes.  As school board member Forrest Rieke explained, “We have more and more 
youngsters showing up less and less prepared to start learning for any number of reasons 
that don’t have anything to do with the educator’s mission, but they are real issues.”62  
Over the years, Portland taxpayers had agreed to pay higher taxes and provide for a large 
number of programs.  Portland’s high property values and commercial property also 
benefited their extensive funds.   
In the weeks leading up to the election, Portland Public Schools Superintendent 
Matthew Prophet became the loudest critic of the disastrous effects that would follow 
from the passage of Measure 5.  Prophet sent a videotaped address to Portland teachers in 
October, in which he emphasized that the measure would cost the district between $25 
and $45 million in its first year alone.  The results, he argued, “would virtually guarantee 
the Portland School District’s return the dark ages of urban public education.”63  Prophet 
appeared on news programs and public forums with sharp retorts about the implications 
of Measure 5, often opposing Don McIntire in person.  At a November 1 forum at 
Buckman School, Prophet attacked proponents of the measure.  “What I resent is people 
coming through with half-cocked solutions,” he declared.  The measure’s backers, he 
claimed, “could care less about kids,” and he vowed Portland students would not be 
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“political pawns for political hacks.”64  Two days before the election, Prophet claimed 
that, if the measure passed, he would have to send every teacher in the district a pink 
slip.65  The superintendent prophesized a bleak future for schools. 
In contrast to Portland, taxpayers in some districts failed consistently to pass 
school levies for their local schools.  By 1990, 46 districts relied on the state’s safety net, 
which allowed districts whose levies had failed to revert to tax levels from the last 
successful levy.66  Many of these poor districts faced the problem of tax effort.  Basically, 
“tax effort” refers to the fact that poor districts with lower property values needed to 
increase their tax rates to raise as much money as wealthy districts with higher property 
values and more commercial property.  To raise the same amount of money per student as 
wealthy districts, poor districts had to impose higher tax rates.  Consequently, many poor 
districts had very high property tax rates but still had lower per-pupil spending than 
wealthy districts, and therefore greater hurdles to get taxpayers to vote for higher tax 
rates.  The problem of tax effort compounded as districts faced population growth.  As 
The Oregonian explained, 
If a district lacks a strong industrial base and support for its community, growth 
can cripple services.  More students demand more expenses for space, textbooks, 
supplies, transportation, and teachers.  Schools must find most of their money to 
pay those costs in local property taxes.  For some districts like Tigard, where 
businesses are expanding and property values are climbing, that usually is not 
hard.  But getting more money can be difficult in other districts—such as Forest 
Grove, Molalla, even Bend-LaPine and Salem—where there are few heavy 
industries driving up property values.  These districts must rely on the willingness 
                                                
64 Barnes C. Ellis, “Measure 5 Exchanges Turn More Vitriolic,” The Oregonian, November 2, 1990, Fourth 
edition. 
65 Barnes C. Ellis, “It’s Bottom-Line Time for Measure 5 Effects,” The Oregonian, June 30, 1991, Fourth 
edition. 
66 Bill Graves, “School Chaos Feared after New Round of Levy Failures,” The Oregonian, September 20, 
1990, Fourth edition. 
 35 
of residents to tax themselves heavily for schools.  That willingness diminishes as 
taxes climb.67 
 
By the time Measure 5 appeared on the state ballot, some districts had fallen into the 
state’s safety net for the fourth and fifth year in a row.   
School districts in the state safety net failed to pass necessary levies and, because 
of tax effort, generally needed to tax at a higher rate than the $5 per $1000 imposed by 
Measure 5.  Following the school levy election September 18, 1990, The Oregonian 
reported that approximately 70,000 students would attend schools in safety net districts, 
twice the amount of the previous year.  “These students in many cases will get fewer 
educational opportunities than their peers elsewhere in the state. Many safety net districts, 
such as Forest Grove and Reynolds, lack bus service. And most of them offer fewer 
courses, activities, books and resources than schools with stronger tax support.”68  
Because of the problem of tax effort many of these districts faced, “Oregon schools may 
face even deeper financial problems if voters on Nov. 6 approve Measure 5, a property 
tax limitation proposal. The measure would lower a lid in phases on property taxes to $5 
per $1,000 of property value—a rate $10 to $15 below what most districts levy.”69  
Foreseeing a severe drop in funding, the vast majority of Oregon school districts opposed 
Measure 5. 
Although some argued that school districts taxing below $5 per $1000 would 
“win” in a Measure 5 landscape, the vast majority of districts opposed the initiative 
because of the uncertainty of secure funding for schools.  Even if many hoped that 
Measure 5 would pressure the legislature for a new revenue source for education, the 
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history of failed tax measures suggested that voters would turn down a new tax.  The City 
Club of Portland determined in its analysis that it would be unlikely that the state would 
be able to create a new revenue source and therefore predicted serious cuts.  It estimated 
that the state had three options: reduce funding for state programs, increase the income 
tax, or create a new tax such as a sales tax.  The City Club report concluded, “Since 
Oregon already ranks fourth in the country in the percent of personal income spent on 
income taxes, any increase in the income tax appears unlikely.  A sales tax has repeatedly 
been defeated by voters.  Thus, the most likely option, at least initially, would be to cut 
state programs.”70  Additionally, while Measure 5 did require the legislature to replace 
funds, it did not stipulate from where or how much, nor did it require those additional 
resources to extend beyond 1995-96. Oregon State University economist Bruce Weber 
pointed out, “If the Legislature found no other source of revenue to replace the property 
tax revenue and decided not to continue the replacement revenue, school districts, which 
currently depend on property taxes for over half their revenue, would find property taxes 
reduced by 67%.”71  Measure 5 created too many financing uncertainties for most school 
districts to support.  In an editorial “Measure 5 is not the answer,” the eastern Oregon 
Argus Observer’s editorial board wrote, “There is no way we can see Measure 5 as not 
crippling the education of our Oregon youth.”72 
The elimination of local control of school finances became yet another argument 
against Measure 5.  By reallocating decision making over school financing to the state 
and preventing local districts from determining at which level to fund their schools, 
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Measure 5 would eliminate local control over local school funding.  As Mayor 
McLaughlin of Pendleton put it, “The state’s going to be telling us what we can do and 
what we can’t do.  If we want to do something here, and the people want it, we should be 
able to do it.”73  Similarly, Portland Public Schools feared losing its investments in social 
service programs such as counseling and after-school care.74   
Malheur County’s Education Service District best summarized the arguments 
against Measure 5 in a letter to the editor of the Argus Observer.   
Malheur County ESD Board joins Oregon School Boards Association, 
Confederation of Oregon School Administrators and other school boards in 
opposing ballot measure 5 and 11 as not being a responsible solution to the 
problems they address.  The board agrees that while our present tax system needs 
an overhaul, these measures are not the answer. 
Ballot Measure #5 provides no assurance of alternative replacement 
revenue.  The state cannot replace the revenue loss from property taxes without 
increasing the remaining sources of revenue such as income tax and decreasing 
tax dollar support to dependent agencies and programs such as cities, counties, 
and welfare programs.  In its attempt to provide school funding, other agencies 
would definitely have their resources reduced… 
There are no provisions made to deal with the revenue problem for 
education after the fiscal year period 1995-96.  Under Measure 5 the legislature 
would decide the issue of funding for schools instead of voters.  Again, it is 
believed that while local voters decry high property taxes they hold clearly their 
right to make decisions about school funding on a local basis…the concept of 
local control.75 
 
Despite protests, Measure 5 remained popular with voters. 
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Table 4 Measure 5 Arguments 
Measure 5 Arguments 
Supporters 
YES on Measure 5 
Opponents 
NO on Measure 5 
• Property taxes too high 
• Supply-side economics: tax cuts grow 
state revenue 
• Education funding fairness 
• Mandates replacement funds for schools 
• Legislature forced to develop alternative 
revenue source 
• Loss of local control 
• Benefits businesses more than 
homeowners 
• Cuts to state, city, and school services 
• Net loss of funds to schools  
• Uncertainty of secure school funding 
• New revenue source unlikely 
 
The Aftermath of Measure 5 
On Election Day, Tuesday, November 6, 1990, Measure 5 passed by a margin of 
528,597 votes to 485,765 (52% to 48%), with broad support from traditionally 
Democratic counties.76  For example, Multnomah County overwhelmingly voted in favor 
of the politically conservative measure, 117,599 to 97,228 (55% to 45%).  The county 
provided 22% of the statewide yes vote.  At the same time, 73% of citizens in Multnomah 
County voted for the Democratic candidate for governor, Barbara Roberts.  That 
Multnomah County voted in favor of both conservative Measure 5 and liberal Barbara 
Roberts suggested that, despite the prophesized doomsday cuts that awaited voters after 
Election Day, the individual burden of property taxes outweighed the fears of cuts.   
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Figure 1 Front Page of The Oregonian, November 7, 1990 
 
Oregonians did not take seriously the fears of cuts; they hoped to have it all.  
Voters aimed to limit property taxes while sending a message to the legislature to pass 
replacement revenue.  Two polls conducted in November 1990 concluded that voters 
passed Measure 5 simply to cut property taxes and that a majority (including those who 
voted in favor of Measure 5) supported a new replacement tax.  The Oregon State 
University Survey Research Center poll concluded, “The strength of support for a state 
replacement tax to fund schools suggests to us that most voters did not view their vote as 
a mandate for significant cuts in spending.  Indeed it is more consistent with the idea that 
voters were seeking a replacement sales tax for schools than that they wanted the major 
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spending cuts now being proposed in state and local government budgets.”77  Similarly, 
an Oregonian poll found that 71% of all respondents, and 66% of respondents who voted 
for Measure 5, favored finding other sources of revenue.  55% favored creating a sales 
tax; 50% favored increasing corporate income taxes.  Only 9% favored increasing income 
taxes.78  The message voters sent on Election Day was not about cuts, but rather about 
changing the tax revenue structure. 
The message that Oregon voters wanted to have it all reflected Citrin’s conclusion 
in his study of Proposition 13; in fact, he subtitled his book, Tax Revolt, “something for 
nothing in California.”79  As he explained, “People want to pay less in taxes; a majority 
also says it prefers a smaller government, even it this means fewer services.  But when 
asked whether government should spend more or less on a particular category of service, 
an overwhelming majority consistently says more for everything except welfare and 
‘administration.’”80  Oregonians too were looking for “something for nothing.” 
Similarly, Kuttner concluded that the relationship between the government and 
the people had shifted; taxpayers had lost faith in government to provide services for the 
current price.  Instead, the public believed there existed massive inefficiencies and that 
taxes should be cut without a proportional cut in services.  As Kuttner expressed, “the 
public believed that the government contained massive amounts of ‘fat,’ like the 
glistening gristle around the edge of a sirloin, which could be trimmed away without 
affecting the quality of public services.”  Unfortunately, Kuttner contended, “The ‘fat’ 
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metaphor really misses the point…One man’s fat is another’s meat.” 81  In other words, 
voters’ hoped government could emerge from the tax limitation slimmer but unscathed.  
It could not. 
In his study of Oregon polls from the 1970s forward, Bruce Weber found that 
much of the impetus to pass a property tax limitation stemmed from the perception that 
the exchange between what people paid in taxes and what the government provided in 
services, or rather the exchange-equity measure, had diminished since OSU began 
monitoring it in 1975.  In 1975, 75% of the adult population of Oregon thought the tax 
system was equitable to them.  By 1990, only 35% agreed.  Over fifteen years, increased 
property taxes without a perceived increase in government services had eroded faith in 
the exchange-equity measure.  “The erosion in the number who believe that the existing 
tax system is equitable is proposed as a fundamental reason Measure 5 was successful.”82 
Table 5 Exchange-Equity Measure 
Exchange-Equity Measure Is the tax system equitable to you? 
Year Yes 
1975 75% 
1980 48% 
1986 50% 
1990 35% 
 
This perspective also reflected Reagan-era supply-side economics.  President 
Reagan sought to cut taxes to restrict the size of government by reducing the amount of 
money available for social programs and strengthen the economy by “liberating the 
private sector and individual initiative from the nefarious grip of big government and its 
attendant bureaucracies,” as historian William C. Berman explained.  Tax cuts appealed 
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to businesses, which argued that new capital would spur investment, in turn increasing 
government tax revenue, while ordinary citizens hoped it would ease their pocketbooks.83   
Though Reagan’s supply-side economics provided an effective political model for 
tax cuts, it had negative long-term consequences.  Like Measure 5, it created an unstable 
underlying economic foundation.  Supply-side economics contributed to increasing 
income inequality, declining standard of living, stagnating real income, and necessitating 
a two-income household.  After the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986, reductions in government 
services, and a massive increase in military spending, the national deficit exceeded $60 
billion by 1990, funded mostly from abroad, an anomaly in its history.84   
So why did Oregon follow in California’s footsteps a decade later?  Measure 5 
embodied the beliefs of the supply-siders.  It aimed to reduce taxes by limiting the 
property tax; it forced government to cut back on social programs and become slimmer 
and more efficient; and it wielded broad support from both Republicans and Democrats, 
as well as from business.  Much of the instability of Reagan’s economic system remained 
hidden behind the ability of the nation to issue debt.  While the state of Oregon could not 
run a deficit, the burgeoning economy of the 1990s concealed the economic instability of 
Measure 5. 
Oregon’s passage of Measure 5 fit into the long legacy of tax revolts prompted by 
California’s Proposition 13.  On November 6, 1990, Oregonians informed their 
government that they wanted a fundamental change in the system.  Democratic 
Governor-elect Barbara Roberts faced insurmountable challenges.  As she put it, “If I 
won the governorship but was faced with the passage of Measure 5 and the potential loss 
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of Democratic control in the House, it could tie my hands both in terms of the state 
budget and my policy agenda.”85  Unfortunately for Roberts, all three came to pass.  She 
noted, “As I contemplated these cuts, I thought back over the last decade of America’s 
so-called tax revolution.  From the 1978 passage of the trend-setting Proposition 13 in 
California that immediately cut $6-$7 billion out of local tax revenues…until Oregon’s 
passage of Measure 5 in 1990, tax revolt was part of the nation’s political lexicon.”86  
How Oregon would manage these new limitations remained to be seen. 
 
Voters expected Measure 5 to create a more equitable system.  They made three 
assumptions: legislators would create and implement an alternative revenue source; 
Oregon would equalize school funding across the state; and the state would be able to 
replace the lost funds to schools from the property tax limitation.  Each of these 
assumptions weighed into the decision to vote for Measure 5, but not all came to fruition.  
Although Oregon did equalize school funding, it neither passed a new revenue source nor 
replaced the funds cut by Measure 5. 
 
Alternative Revenue Source 
In the year following the passage of Measure 5, a strong economy enabled the 
state to buy some time before the predicted cuts set in.  The governor and legislature used 
the excess revenue to restore many of the planned cuts in human resources and 
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education.87  However, the upswing in the economy only masked the new structural 
revenue challenges created by Measure 5.  The increased funds provided by the 
legislature did not outpace rising costs.  “The significance in the first year of Measure 5 
for most state agencies is more money, in real dollar terms, but reduced services for 
clients as inflation, wage increases, and turbocharged health-care costs eat into the 
additional taxes.”88  Despite this reality, the media’s portrayal of continuing abundance in 
the media numbed voters to the true effects of Measure 5. 
Governor Roberts heeded the voters’ call for an alternative revenue source.  She 
aimed to pass a sales tax, but the strong economy transformed the perception of need 
from dire to muted.  The Oregonian explained, “Despite gloomy predictions about 
Measure 5, a healthy economy, some new taxes and fees and the slow phase-in of the tax 
measure made its debut anti-climatic…The contrast between the early doomsday 
scenarios and a state general fund budget $800 million larger than the last one will make 
it harder for Roberts to convince voters that government can be trusted to spend 
wisely.”89  Don McIntire, the initiative’s leader, capitalized on the healthy economy to 
declare the accuracy of his predictions.  “When everyone was talking doomsday, I said, 
‘Remember, in a lot of areas we’ll be cutting rates in more than half.  But that doesn’t 
mean it cuts revenues in half’…What we did was put a reasonable, prudent protection for 
citizens in place…We certainly didn’t eliminate the property tax.”  He cautioned that 
Oregonians “should think twice about getting suckered into giving government any new 
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general tax.”90  Roberts faced what proved to be an insurmountable challenge: changing 
perceptions. 
Oregon’s basic problem stemmed from an unstable tax structure.  Oregon relied 
solely on property and income taxes, while most states also included a sales tax.91  As the 
state’s economy grew, rising property values and increased incomes translated into higher 
state revenues.  However, during recessions or even minor downswings in the business 
cycle, the state was left vulnerable when Oregonians in need more often turned to 
government services.  Governor Roberts foresaw the need to address this flaw:  “As 1992 
passed, as we edged closer to the billion dollar budget ‘cliff’ we would face in 1993-95, I 
saw little indication of any major tax proposals under discussion by the interim 
committees of the House or Senate.  I was willing to be the ‘bad cop’ if it meant a chance 
to reform our tax structure and avoid the ugly cuts.”92  A sales tax would mean additional 
revenue for the state, but voters had turned down a sales tax eight times in Oregon’s 
history, most recently in 1986 when 78% of voters opposed the measure.93  Could 
Governor Roberts accomplish what so many had failed to do before? 
Because the Oregon Constitution required a sales tax to go before a vote of the 
citizens, Roberts began a campaign, which she called “Conversation with Oregon,” to 
shift public opinion about taxes.  The goal behind the publicity push was to reach out and 
educate citizens across the state about “their tax structure, its dollar impact on state and 
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local government programs, and the detailed expenditures of the state budget.”  Roberts 
recalled, 
This extensive effort to bring “real” numbers and better understanding of taxes 
and budgets to thousands of my state’s citizen was much more than Taxes 101 for 
these Oregon participants.  We wanted them to share their newfound knowledge 
in their homes, at work, at the barbershop, bowling alley, PTA, and coffee shop.  
The knowledge these citizens would carry away from the Conversation could 
easily multiply into a million better informed voters…or so I hoped.94 
 
Roberts held six regional meetings set up and run by volunteers, which were broadcast 
simultaneously to satellite meetings across the state.  By its close, over ten thousand 
Oregonians had participated in nine hundred local meetings of the Conversation with 
Oregon.95   
Despite Roberts’ inclusive approach to rebuilding citizens’ trust in government, 
the media generally panned the meetings.  The Oregonian reported that she only reached 
10,000 of the 20,000 anticipated voters, that “the latest conversations with the governor 
are sparsely attended and most opinions favor budget cuts, not reform,” and that “cynics 
have suggested that Roberts’ ‘Conversation with Oregon’ is little more than a dog-and-
pony show to give her the cover to drag out her favored solution to the Measure 5-
induced budget crunch: a 5 percent tax on goods and services.”96  Indeed, the 
Conversation with Oregon did just that.  After tabulating surveys collected at the various 
meetings, results found that 90% of participants wanted greater efficiency from 
government and that 73% said the tax system needed restructuring.97  Though many 
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insisted that the Conversation failed to create a “groundswell of support for increases in 
taxes among the people,” and that “it would be political suicide to float this kind of [sales 
tax] proposal,”98 Roberts moved forward with her plan to enact a sales tax. 
The Governor called a special session of the legislature on July 1, 1992, to 
consider her tax package, but the legislature refused to refer it to the voters.  The plan 
included a 3.5% sales tax on goods, an increase in the property tax rate for commercial 
property, a personal income tax graduated reduction, and immediate implementation of 
the Measure 5 tax relief instead of the five-year step-down.  The package was expected to 
raise $950 million per biennium.99  
The Roberts tax plan failed because of politics.  First, while Roberts invested time 
and money to convince voters of the need for tax reform, she failed to do the same with 
the legislators in Salem, who felt “snubbed.”  In addition, Roberts sparred with House 
speaker Larry Campbell (R-Eugene), over the date of the election: Roberts wanted a 
special election in September using vote-by-mail, while Campbell insisted on the 
November general election at the polls.  Neither budged.  Ultimately, Campbell blocked 
the legislation.100  The bill never left the House floor to a referendum to the voters.  
Roberts described this as “the largest failure of my political career,”101  
The bipartisan panel the Legislature created thereafter to develop a revenue 
source for the state also failed to come up with solutions.102  According to Roberts, “My 
answer had been rejected.  Theirs never materialized…Legislative egos can outweigh 
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good public policy.”103  Despite indications that voters were ready to support a sales tax, 
the politics became insurmountable. 
The last chapter in the sales tax question came and went half-heartedly.  In the 
1993 legislative session, a group of politicians from both parties managed to squeak by a 
sales tax measure to be referred to the voters in the November 1993 election.104  This was 
not the more comprehensive tax package developed by Roberts, but rather a simple 5% 
sales tax dedicated to schools.  Fraught with debate, no true grass roots supporters, and 
even little money behind the opposition,105 the sales tax referendum, Measure 1, failed 
721,930 (75%) to 240,991 (25%).106  A sales tax in Oregon had fallen short for the ninth 
time.  Norma Paulus, the state superintendent of public instruction concluded, “The 
message is very clear…The people will not change the [tax] system until they see state 
government downsize.”107  Tim Hibbitts, who conducted an October poll showing that 
nearly two-thirds of voters opposed the measure, concluded, “‘There is no confidence in 
government out there,’…adding that the cynicism among voters was the highest he has 
seen in his 20 years of political polling.”108  Although polls indicated that the voters who 
passed Measure 5 did so because they favored an alternative revenue source, it took two 
years before the legislature even considered one, and three years before a proposal 
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reached the voters.  In that time, the wavering faith of Oregonians in state government 
had evaporated.   
Furthermore, by 1996 Oregonians demanded even more tax relief.  Bill Sizemore 
of Oregon Taxpayers United sponsored Measure 47, which aimed to cut-and-cap taxes by 
rolling back property taxes by ten percent and capping its increase to three percent 
annually.109  He argued, “Putting a cap on property tax increases is the only way to repair 
an unfair system…Judging by history, the Legislature is politically incapable of resolving 
this problem.  Leadership from the governor's office is also highly unlikely…It is clear, 
therefore, that if Oregonians want to limit property taxes, they will have to do so 
themselves.”110  In November 1996, Measure 47 passed 52% to 48%.111  Six months later 
Measure 50 passed, a follow-up referendum from the legislature to clarify the 
complexities of Measure 47.  Measure 50 converted property tax from a tax base system 
to a tax rate system by establishing a permanent tax rate based on the assessed value of 
each property.  Consequently, while the total amount of taxes collected by a local tax 
district could increase, the assessed value of a property could not increase more than 3% 
per year, regardless of real market value.112   
Measure 50 created a gap between the total possible revenue that could be 
collected under the Measure 5 limitations of $15 per $1000 and the amount collected 
under the three percent annual assessed value increase.  To recapture the eligible funds, 
voters were allowed under Measure 50 to approve temporary bonds or local-option levies 
                                                
109 James Mayer, “Cut-and-Cap Ballot Proposal Would Lower Taxes But Raises Uncertainties,” The 
Oregonian, September 4, 1996, Sunrise edition. 
110 Bill Sizemore, “Sizemore: Measure 47,” The Oregonian, October 6, 1996, Sunrise edition. 
111 “Official Results, State Measure No. 47, 11/5/96 General Election,” Election History Archive, accessed 
January 13, 2014, http://www.oregonvotes.gov/pages/history/archive/nov596/results/m47.html. 
112 The New Direction of the Oregon Property Tax System Under Measure 50, Research Report (Salem, Or: 
Legislative Revenue Office, November 1999). 
 50 
to supplement revenue so long as an individual’s property tax bill remained under the 
Measure 5 threshold.  However, Measure 50 further restricted the passage of local option 
levies by requiring that a double majority, half of registered voters, must turnout to 
validate a local levy election, which made it exceedingly difficult to recapture these 
funds.113  Consequently, whereas under Measure 5 property tax revenue increased as 
assessed value increased, after Measure 50 revenue increased more slowly since assessed 
value was restricted to a three percent annual increase.114   
 
Equalization of School Funding 
The second assumption Oregonians made in voting for Measure 5 was that the 
legislature would equalize school funding.  Equalization meant that every student, 
regardless of location, class, or race, would receive the same amount of school funding.  
Prior to Measure 5, Oregon’s system of school funding had depended on local property 
taxes, resulting in wealthy districts’ ability to spend more per-pupil than poor districts.  In 
1971, California struck down this method of funding and instituted equalization, starting 
a trend away from local control of school funding.  This move influenced Californian 
voters to pass Proposition 13.  Like the tax revolt, Oregonians hoped to follow California 
and implement equalization of school funding. 
By the time Californians faced Proposition 13 at the ballot box, school-funding 
equalization had also transformed the local property tax.  In August 23, 1968, parents of 
twenty-seven students filed suit against the State of California.  They argued that 
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California’s system of funding public schools discriminated against the poor, because the 
quality of education depended upon the wealth of the district, violating the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The parents were influenced by the 
Arthur Wise’s 1967 book, Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal 
Educational Opportunity, which argued, “there is no justification—constitutional or 
otherwise—for permitting the circumstances of parental wealth and geography to 
determine the quality of a child’s education in the public schools of a state.”115  In John 
Serrano Jr.(the lead plaintiff), et al., v. Ivy Baker Priest (Priest was the Treasurer of the 
State of California), the Supreme Court of California decided 6-1 in favor of the plaintiffs 
on August 30, 1971.  The majority opinion declared,  
We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against 
the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the 
wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an 
education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be 
conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose necessitating 
the present method of financing.116   
 
Serrano required a significant change to the method of funding schools through 
local property taxes, severing the connection between wealth and per-pupil spending.  
However, it did not dictate how to fund schools equally.  Opponents of the decision 
feared that wealthy districts would be dragged down to the median level.  Lawyers for the 
plaintiffs asked the court for restraint from mandating the new system of school 
financing.  “All the California court was asked to do was to establish the principle of 
‘fiscal neutrality’—that is, to declare that whatever method is used to support schools it 
may not constitutionally be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a 
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whole.”117  The Supreme Court of California complied, striking down the current method 
of funding without dictating a new one.  Consequently, in 1977, the California legislature 
passed A.B. 65 to implement school funding equalization. 
Serrano proponents suffered a setback on March 21, 1973 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled against a group of Mexican-American parents from Texas who filed suit 
against their school district in San Antonio Independent School District et al. v. 
Rodriguez, et al.  Similar to Serrano, these parents argued that Texas’ school funding 
system based on local property taxes violated the Fourteenth Amendment by 
discriminating against the state’s poor and minority students.  The court rejected this 
argument, holding that education was not a fundamental right.  Justice Powell wrote, 
“The Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages.”  Therefore, Powell reasoned, Texas was not obstructing the education of 
students, it merely did not step in to equalize school funding.  “Even if it were conceded 
that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to 
the meaningful exercise of either right,” Powell asserted, “we have no indication that the 
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.”  
Consequently, the court left it up to states to decide how to fund their school systems.118 
Despite this ruling against equalization, by 1978, twenty-four states had followed 
California and passed similar school-tax reforms based on equal protection clauses in 
their state constitutions.  While varying in method, virtually all these measures subsidized 
the taxing power of poor districts with state income tax funds.  By 1978, when 
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Proposition 13 passed, some of the effects of equalization were apparent.  The New York 
Times reported, “According to studies in California, Michigan, and elsewhere by the 
Rand Corporation, poor districts have used the overwhelming bulk of their funds for 
auxiliary educational services, such as counselors and teaching aids.  Such districts have 
also shown themselves to be more likely to hire new teachers to reduce class size than to 
increase the salaries of present teachers” (as opponents had feared).  On the other hand, 
these states also demonstrated that local control of schools was diminishing.  As the state 
took on more responsibility for funding, it became “more inclined to make sure that their 
policies are working satisfactorily.”  This influx of state funding into education, as well 
as new state taxes to “level-up” poor districts, increased school financing by 58% in the 
14 states with equalization from 1973-1977, while the national average remained at 51%.  
Equalization increased school funding overall.119 
While many voters favored equalization of school funding, others saw the 
Serrano decision as destroying local control of schools, and contributing to the passage of 
Proposition 13 in California.  Prior to Serrano, taxpayers could see the link between their 
taxes and schools.  If local voters chose to tax themselves greatly, then their local schools 
benefitted.  This bettered not only families with school-age children but all homeowners 
because good schools increased their home values.120   
After the California legislature implemented the Serrano decision through A.B. 
65 in 1977, that link between property taxes and schools unraveled. California centralized 
property tax collection and redistributed funds to equalize education spending across the 
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state.121  “By giving the state, in essence, a uniform statewide property tax, distributed by 
the State Legislature, it has already had the effect of forcing greater equalization of 
school spending.”122  As property taxes increased, homeowners did not see the additional 
funds directed to their local schools.  As Dartmouth economics professor William Fischel 
has argued, “homeowners supported property taxes as long as those taxes paid for local 
schools, because well-financed local schools were good for their property values.  But 
once property taxes were to be redistributed away from local schools to other districts, 
many voters who had previously opposed property-tax limitation swung in favor of 
Proposition 13.”123 
Equalization shaped Oregonians’ views of Measure 5 as well, although for a 
different reason.  There was no equivalent to the Serrano decision in Oregon.  Voters 
hoped that the centralization of school funding produced by Measure 5 would lead to 
equalization.  In 1989, a collection of students, parents, and 56 school districts across the 
state, representing over 20% of Oregon students, filed suit against the state in Coalition 
for Equitable School Funding v. State of Oregon.  Lower courts decided in favor of the 
state, citing Olsen v. Oregon (1976) in which the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the 
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Oregon constitution did not require equitable funding for “the establishment of a uniform 
and general system of common schools.”124  However, following the passage of Measure 
5, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the case since the system of school 
funding had suddenly and significantly changed.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court again 
found that the Oregon constitution accepted inherent inequities resulting from property 
tax disparities.  Justice Graber wrote, “the state must fund centrally whatever it requires 
and that the constitution does not countenance disparities from one school district to 
another, with respect to either financial benefits or tax burdens…[it] contemplates and 
permits those disparities.”125 Though many had hoped a court decision would force the 
legislature to develop an equitable system of funding schools, now their hopes hinged on 
the legislature’s will to equalize as it attempted to solve the school financing mess 
brought about by Measure 5.126 
Should the legislature have failed to pass some sort of equalization, many feared 
the district inequities as they existed in the 1990-91 school year might be etched in stone.  
The Oregon Education Association predicted that each individual district would lobby the 
state for increased funding, opening up opportunities for favoritism and corruption.  “You 
can believe that every school superintendent and many administrators will be down there 
saying, ‘My district deserves more.’…It will come down to perceptions, who is perceived 
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as wealthy and who is not…I see a big free-for-all down there…and that’s just for 
schools.”127 
The state legislature did take steps to equalize school funding in its 1991 session.  
Senate Bill 815 created a transition formula for the 1991-92 school year, and Senate Bill 
814 created a permanent equalization formula.  SB 815, the transition formula, aimed to 
replace funds lost by Measure 5, although without any adjustments for rising inflation or 
health care premiums, or the 30% the state already provided through the Basic School 
Support Fund.128  Wealthy districts were “flat-funded” while the state allocated an 
additional $30 million to 85 of the state’s poorest district to help level up to the mean per-
pupil spending.129  SB 815 met the challenge of how to fund the first year of Measure 5 
implementation, 1991-92, when the property tax limitation could not exceed $15 per 
$1000 for schools by restraining wealthy districts and aiding poor districts. 
SB 814 created the equalization formula moving forward.  The formula 
recognized that districts had different costs based on a number of factors.  First, the state 
calculated the number of students in a district by average daily membership (ADM) and 
then adjusted the count “to reflect the difference in cost of educating different types of 
students,” creating a weighted per-pupil distribution (ADMw).  For example, students 
received a weight of 2.0 for special education, 1.5 for English as a Second Language, and 
1.25 for poverty, as well as a few other weights to account for small rural school districts.  
The maximum weight a student could receive could not exceed 3.0.  Next, the state 
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adjusted the base funding per student by the district’s average teacher experience.  Since 
teacher salaries are partially based on years of experience, districts with more senior 
teachers had higher salary costs each year, for which the formula needed to account.  
Last, the state also agreed to provide 70% of approved transportation costs in the 
transportation grant.130  The state distributed the general purpose grant from the newly 
created State School Fund (SSF), which replaced the Basic School Support Fund.  The 
final permanent equalization formula became: 131 
Table 6 Equalization Formula 
 STATE SCHOOL FUND EQUALIZATION FORMULA 
 
 
 State 
School 
Fund 
Grant 
+ Local Revenues = 
Base 
Funding 
Per Student 
Adjusted By 
Teacher 
Experience 
X ADMw + Transportation Grant 
 
            
 
The system created by this formula did not favor or disadvantage districts based 
on their ability to raise tax revenue, but instead looked at the cost of educating each 
student and left the allocation of those funds up to local districts.  The League of Women 
Voters reported, “Thus, each district’s total funding is based solely on the base funding 
and the cost factors…It does not matter what a district receives in property taxes.  The 
only thing that matters is the state-wide total.”132  As The Oregonian noted, “In one 
sense, Measure 5 solves Oregon’s chronic school-finance problem: The state never 
carried enough of the burden to assure stability, leaving the fate of schools to the whims 
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of local citizens in levy vote after levy vote.”133  The equalization formula created a 
stable and predictable equation for distribution of funds; nonetheless, districts now relied 
on the whims of the state to determine the base funding per student, the most significant 
variable in this formula. 
Immediate implementation of the new formula would have created extreme losses 
and increases for individual districts.  Therefore the state constrained the application of 
the formula to minimize cutbacks to wealthy districts while leveling-up poor districts 
during the ratcheting down of Measure 5 limitations through 1995-96, when the 
limitation would hit bottom at $5 per $1000.  “Given the limited money available this 
budget cycle, the bill is designed to phase in the pain for the losers.”134  The state took 
different approaches to this constraint based on the available revenue each year.  For 
example, in 1992-93, it held steady allocations for wealthy districts, while capping 
increases in poor districts at 25%.  However, with fewer funds in 1993-94, the state chose 
to “spread the pain equally” by freezing all district allocations but providing $10 million 
in aid for the poorest districts.  “The main effect of this was to ‘equalize up’ many 
districts into much closer parity with other districts.  In addition, the high spending 
districts were ‘equalized down’ somewhat because they were given no allowance for 
inflation or enrollment growth.”135  Constraining the state school funding formula to 
mitigate (but not eliminate) losses to wealthy districts resulted at first in 71% of districts 
funded through the equalization formula in 1992-93; by 1998-99, 92% of districts 
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received their funds through the formula.136  Step by step, through the 1990s Oregon 
equalized school funding. 
 
Replacement of Lost Funds 
Despite this, over the course of the decade education spending decreased in 
Oregon.  Although Oregonians banked on the mandate in Measure 5 that the state would 
replace lost funds, and therefore school monies would not decline, this assumption only 
became partially true in the years that followed.  As Attorney General Frohnmayer 
indicated during the campaign, Measure 5 required the state to replace funds lost because 
of the limitation, but this did not include the 30% of funds schools already received from 
the state’s Basic School Support Fund (BSSF).137  Consequently, “The state, under the 
guidelines of Measure 5, replaced only 70% of the revenue lost by school districts as a 
result of the property tax limitation measure.  Many districts experienced reductions in 
their budgets.”138  At the starting gate, districts began the decade with a 30% reduction.  
Despite a strong economy, the state lost revenue overall as a result of the property tax 
limitation.  Legislators worried about even finding the funds for the equalization formula.  
After SB 815 passed, Senator Bill Bradbury (D-Bandon), co-chair of the Joint Ways and 
Means Committee, remarked, “‘Everyone’s in denial’ about the consequences of Measure 
5 on the state budget.  ‘Where does that money come from?’”139   
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The money never materialized; in fact, school funding, now the largest portion of 
the state’s budget, decreased over the decade.  The first Oregon Quality Education Model 
(QEM) report, published in 1999 by a committee appointed to study the cost of education 
in Oregon, noted that when adjusted for inflation, per-pupil spending had decreased since 
the passage of Measure 5.  “For the last ten years, Oregon state and local school resources 
on a per student basis have grown at 60% of the rate of inflation, reducing the inflation 
adjusted dollars from $4100 (per weighted student) in 1990 to $3300 per student in 
1998.”  Additionally the QEM declared that even this “reasonable” level of funding was 
only possible because of  “a remarkably strong state economy.”140  Oregonians had hoped 
for a highly funded, more equitable system of school financing; instead Measure 5 
created an equalized system of poorly funded schools.  Education in Oregon had been 
leveled-down. 
 
The three assumptions upon which many Oregonians based their votes in favor of 
Measure 5 in 1990 did not result in the system they expected.  While the legislature 
equalized school funding across the state, it did not create a new source of revenue, 
which diminished its ability to sufficiently fund public schools.  Over the course of the 
1990s, Oregonians watched school funding decrease.  Instead of “something for 
nothing,”141 Oregonians got what they paid for: an equitable system of poorly funded 
schools. 
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Chapter Two: School Reform in Oregon 
 
At the same time Oregon radically altered its structure of school financing, it also 
transformed the curriculum in its public schools.  Directly in the wake of Measure 5, 
Oregon legislators, bolstered by their expanded authority over school funding, passed 
House Bill 3565, the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century in the June 1991 
legislative session.  Representative Vera Katz (D-Portland), the bill’s author, declared, 
“This is bold.  It is a revolution.”  For a “revolutionary” piece of legislation, it “passed 
both houses with surprisingly little opposition,” with a vote of 53-5 in the House and 26-1 
in the Senate.  Most explained the inattention to the bill as a result of Oregonians’ focus 
on Measure 5.1  But as the implementation of this equally monumental change to 
education began, growing opposition led Oregonians to question the content, purpose, 
and structure of schooling. 
The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century proposed to redesign the 
educational system from pre-kindergarten through high school in order to “achieve 
educational standards of performance and outcomes that match the highest of any in the 
world for all students.”  The bill stated that “a restructured educational system is 
necessary to achieve the state’s goals of the best educated citizens in the nation by the 
year 2000 and a work force equal to any in the world by the year 2010.”2  Among its 
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many provisions, the bill stipulated providing pre-kindergarten Head Start to all children 
by 1999 and creating wrap-around support services such as health care and social 
workers in all schools.3  It recommended mixed-age grouping of elementary students in 
kindergarten through third grade, and small schools within schools at the middle school 
level.  It focused on untracked classes, performance-based assessments, project-based 
learning, and real-world problem solving.4  Students would need to meet statewide 
benchmarks in the third, fifth, eighth, and tenth grade to demonstrate they were on-target. 
The main focus of the bill was the creation of the Certificate of Initial Mastery 
(CIM) and the Certificate of Advanced Mastery (CAM) at the high school level.  It 
required students to obtain the Certificate of Initial Mastery around the tenth grade before 
proceeding to earn the Certificate of Advanced Mastery by the end of high school.  To 
pass the CIM, a student needed to demonstrate “the knowledge and skills to read, write, 
problem solve, think critically, and communicate across the disciplines, at national 
levels” through work samples, tests, and portfolios.5  Students would be able to 
demonstrate their abilities when they felt ready, which, The Oregonian indicated, 
“represents a fundamental shift in the education system.  Students would advance on the 
basis of performance rather than of age and time served in class.”6  After receiving a 
Certificate of Initial Mastery, the final two years of high school would be focused on the 
Certificate of Advanced Mastery, in which students would specialize in one of six 
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pathways to prepare them for college and the workforce.7  The pathways from which 
students could choose included arts and communications, business and management, 
health services, human resources, industrial and engineering systems, and natural 
resource systems.  Students would work towards the CAM through traditional classroom 
courses, community college courses, vocational schools, or through school-business 
partnerships that offered apprenticeships or technical training programs.8  Together the 
CIM and CAM fundamentally changed the system to become individually paced and 
student-centered.  The Oregonian observed, “This move from credits to standards marks 
a fundamental shift in focus, from the process of education to the results, from what 
schools teach to what students learn, from what goes into education to what comes out.”9 
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Figure 2 Oregonian Diagram of Oregon School Reform10 
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The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century made Oregon a forerunner in 
statewide school reform.  It emerged from a growing national movement for school 
change initiated by the release of A Nation at Risk by Secretary of Education Terrell H. 
Bell in 1983.  A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform alerted the public 
to the dire state of American education, often using hyperbolic rhetoric.  The report 
proclaimed, “The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a 
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.”  This 
“mediocrity” stemmed from low standards, minimum requirements, poor teachers, and 
less time spent in school and on homework.  It criticized schools for offering a “curricular 
smorgasbord” with no central focus: “we have a cafeteria style curriculum in which the 
appetizers and desserts can easily be mistaken for the main courses.”11  The report 
understood an economic purpose to schooling and aimed to become more competitive in 
the global economy by improving the educational system of the United States.  
“Knowledge, learning, information, and skilled intelligence are the new raw materials of 
international commerce and are today spreading throughout the world…individuals who 
do not possess the levels of skill, literacy, and training essential to this new era will be 
effectively disenfranchised.”12  Infusing Cold War rhetoric into the plea for school 
reform, the commission placed education atop the national agenda. 
A Nation at Risk awoke the nation to the quality of schooling in America.  In the 
1960s and 1970s, following Civil Rights legislation and President Johnson’s Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the focus of educational reform had been access—
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opportunities for those traditionally left out of the educational system including blacks, 
other minorities, the poor, women, and students with special needs.  A Nation at Risk 
reoriented those priorities, shifting the focus of educational reform from inclusion to 
achievement.  Americans saw the educational system as the answer to global 
competitiveness and capable of solving virtually any societal problem.  Following A 
Nation at Risk, a multitude of education reports released throughout the 1980s 
documented the need for increased academic achievement.13   
 
Outcome-Based Education 
The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century answered the call of A Nation at 
Risk to raise standards for all students and produce a more competitive workforce.  It 
followed a map presented in a 1990 report from the Commission on the Skills of the 
American Workforce of the National Center on Education and the Economy entitled 
America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages!14  This report diagnosed the problem that 
real average weekly earnings in the United States had fallen by more than twelve percent 
since 1969 as a failure to increase workforce productivity.  Because of globalization, the 
commission explained, the United States could not strengthen its economy simply by 
adding new jobs or better machinery because low wage countries would undercut 
American wage standards.  Therefore, “the key to productivity improvement for a high 
                                                
13 Patricia Albjerg Graham, Schooling America: How the Public Schools Meet the Nation’s Changing 
Needs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 158–166. 
14 Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce, America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages! 
(Rochester, NY: National Center on Education and the Economy, June 1990).  Headed by University of 
Rochester education professor Mark Tucker, its statement of purpose reads, “The National Center on 
Education and the Economy is a not-for-profit organization created to develop proposals for building the 
world class education and training system that the United States must have if it is to have a world class 
economy.  The Center engages in policy analysis and development and works collaboratively with other at 
local, state, and national levels to advance its proposals in the policy arena.” 
 67 
wage nation lies in the third industrial revolution…the advent of the computer, high 
speed communication and universal education.”  Taylorist work organization developed 
for factories of the 1900s declined as management layers disappeared in the new 
information age and front-line workers assumed more responsibility.  This shift required 
large investments in training.  As the commission explained, “the American post-
secondary education and training system was never designed to meet the needs of our 
front-line workers…Education is rarely connected to training and both are rarely 
connected to an effective job service function.”15  The commission asserted that 
Americans were making a choice, consciously or by default: 
It is a choice that will lead to an America where 30 percent of our people may do 
well—at least for a while—but the other 70 percent will see their dreams slip 
away.  The choice that America faces is a choice between high skills and low 
wages.  Gradually, silently, we are choosing low wages.  We still have time to 
make the other choice—one that will lead us to a more prosperous future.  To 
make this choice, we must fundamentally change our approach to work and 
education.16 
 
America’s Choice laid out a path to choose “high skills” through the 
reorganization of education to develop the relevant connections between the workplace 
and the schoolhouse.  The commission created and defined the Certificate of Initial 
Mastery as the pinnacle of a new system through which students would progress from 
pre-kindergarten to the workforce.  “The Certificate of Initial Mastery would certify labor 
market readiness, and mastery of the basic skills necessary for high productivity 
employment.  The same Certificate would also be required for entry into all subsequent 
forms of education, including college preparatory and certified professional and technical 
                                                
15 Ibid., 1–4. 
16 Ibid., 5. 
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programs.”17  By reengineering the school system in terms of preparation for the 
workforce, the commission reiterated the economic purpose of education. 
America’s Choice became the foundation of the Oregon Educational Act for the 
21st Century, and by no mistake.  On the board of trustees of the National Center on 
Education and the Economy sat Vera Katz,18 who crafted and introduced the bill to the 
Oregon House.  She insisted that “the state can no longer afford to ‘waste’ children by 
allowing them to drop out of school.  Industry needs them all if Oregon’s economy is to 
compete and prosper.”19  The Oregon Legislature agreed.  By 1995, ten other states had 
signed on to the High-Skills Consortium and committed to pursue the goals published in 
America’s Choice.20 
Unlike the preponderance of standardized testing, America’s Choice emphasized, 
“thinking based achievement [such as performance assessments, portfolios, and project-
based learning], not routinized skills.”21  The commission argued that the new workforce 
needed more than standardized testing.  “Standardized tests used for secondary school 
students favor superficial answers not based on real understanding over those requiring 
thoughtful analysis…As it exists, the testing system this country uses to measure its 
students discourages the development of higher order thinking.”22  The commission 
recommended instead a cumulative certification system. 
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Figure 3 Schematic Representation of America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages! 
This concept of “thinking based achievement” and “performance assessments” 
derived from a type of school reform called outcome-based education (OBE).  Education 
professor William Spady, the movement’s founder, grew up in Milwaukie, Oregon, and 
during the 1970s worked with James Block (also an Oregonian) and Benjamin Bloom on 
“mastery learning,” the precursor to outcome-based education.23  The main underpinning 
for mastery learning and outcome-based education was that school should not be based 
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on Carnegie units of seat time—a student earning credit for a course based on the number 
of hours of class time—but instead on demonstrations of what the student knew and 
could do.  Spady wanted to turn “time into a variable instead of time being a constant.”24  
Because students learn at different rates, they should be able to earn credit based on their 
outcomes, not time.  “Spady was not interested in whether graduates passed any courses.  
He wanted indicators they could actually do something in their ‘performance roles.’”25  
This thrust became outcome-based education. 
In 1980 Spady founded Network for Outcome-Based Schools and from 1980-
1993 OBE expanded into school districts in forty-two states, including Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado, and Arizona.26  Despite the spread of outcome-based 
education, OBE experienced some resistance as Spady struggled to communicate its 
definition.  In terms of the work of teachers, he wrote,  
Being outcome-based meant developing a clear focus on what was essential for 
their student to be able to do successfully, then applying good common sense to 
get there.  These instructors assessed their students’ performances on exactly the 
thing they told them and taught them were most important.  And they didn’t 
consider either the students or themselves ‘done’ until the learners could 
demonstrate the intended outcome, or performance successfully.  Grades, credit, 
advancement to a new curriculum level, and final credentials and certification 
were all directly tied to these successful demonstrations.27 
 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Spady traveled around the country, conducted 
seminars with educators, and helped districts develop their own outcomes.  Put simply, 
“outcomes are clear, observable demonstrations of student learning that occur after a 
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significant set of learning experiences.”  These demonstrations should show what the 
student knows and can do and “the student’s confidence and motivation in carrying out 
the demonstration.”  Outcomes were often cross disciplinary and focused on “real-world” 
goals for their graduates. 28  
Following the 1991 passage of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, 
the state Board of Education first adopted Oregon’s outcomes in 1992 grounded in OBE.  
The Oregon Department of Education also struggled to communicate what exactly 
outcome-based education meant, explaining that, “outcome-based education clearly 
defines the standards students must achieve.  At the heart of outcome-based education is 
an important question: ‘What do we want students to know and be able to do?’  The 
answers to this question are the results, or outcomes, we want students to achieve.”  In 
Oregon, to earn a Certificate of Initial Mastery, students needed to demonstrate 
proficiency in eleven outcomes: 
1. Apply mathematics and science to practical situations 
2. Think critically, creatively and reflectively in making decisions and solving 
problems 
3. Communicate by reading, writing, speaking and listening 
4. Direct own learning by planning and carrying out complex projects 
5. Deliberate on public issues by applying the social sciences 
6. Use computers and other technology to process information and produce 
documents 
7. Interpret literature and the visual and performing arts 
8. Quantify numerical relationships by applying measurement, statistics, probability, 
geometry and algebra 
9. Understand human diversity and communicate in a second language 
10. Work with others and in teams 
11. Understand positive health habits29 
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The Oregon Department of Education (ODE) revised these outcomes, or 
performance standards as they were also called, in 1994 in order to replace course credits 
for graduation.  ODE likened performance standards to earning a drivers license; by 
passing a written examination and behind-the-wheel test, students demonstrated both 
what they knew and were able to do.  The Oregonian differentiated these performance 
standards from traditional methods of assessment in that “they define acceptable levels of 
performance on the basis of a well-defined scoring scale that can be used consistently by 
all teachers.”  The success of Oregon’s reform efforts hinged on these performance 
standards.  “If they are weak, murky or inconsistent, state educators say, the improvement 
plan will fail.”30 
The nationwide controversy over outcome-based education reached a crescendo 
in 1994.  Entire issues of the journals Educational Leadership, School Administrator, and 
The American School Board Journal were devoted to debating OBE.31  Critics across the 
political spectrum argued that its foundation, the outcomes, were vague and illusive.  
Albert Shanker, the president of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), 
admonished, “OBE standards do include academic outcomes, but these outcomes are so 
few and so vague that they would be satisfied by almost any level of achievement.”32  
Critics also objected to OBE’s emphasis on behaviors.  “We also oppose transformational 
OBE because it shifts the focus from cognitive education to affective education.  Rather 
than giving instruction in facts, information, and academics, the educator provides 
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instruction in feelings, values, and attitudes.”33  Conservative Christian groups found 
OBE offensive.  “Traditionalist Christian parents have serious problems with outcomes 
that purport to celebrate diversity, choice, and tolerance.  For them, such outcomes 
constitute an implied repudiation of traditional family structures.”34  To most of these 
critiques, Spady replied that critics misunderstood OBE, or that “not everything that is 
called OBE actually is.”35  In article after article, he continued to debunk the “myths” 
surrounding outcome-based education.36 
In Oregon, opposition grew after passage of Oregon Educational Act for the 21st 
Century.  Skeptics feared “that what appeared to be a liberal education would in fact 
teach students only technical skills needed for private industry jobs; that the career-
decision made after the 10th grade would result in a rigid tracking system; and that the 
state should be doing more to work with the present system rather than trying to design 
an entirely new one.”37   By 1995 concerns extended to direct critiques of OBE.  The 
Oregonian noted, 
Some lawmakers, such as Sen. Tom Hartung, R-Portland, chairman of the Senate 
Education Committee, question the premise of the reform plan, which stresses 
learning techniques and demonstrations of competency through portfolios rather 
than traditional curriculum and grades.  “I’ve found very little enthusiasm,” said 
Hartung.  “People particularly didn’t like the outcomes-based education aspect of 
it.”38 
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In 1994 Ron Sunseri, a former Republican legislator and one of the few votes 
against H.B. 3565, published Outcome-Based Education: Understanding the Truth about 
Education Reform, which became a manual in the fight against OBE.  He wrote, “Don’t 
be fooled into thinking that it couldn’t happen in your state.  It is happening everywhere.  
If OBE isn’t in your district now, it is only a matter of time...But don’t despair.  This 
book is designed to give you the information you need to stand up for what you believe 
education should accomplish in your school district.”39  Upon a visit to Oregon, Spady 
commented, “Probably no state has been as personalized in their attack against me as 
these Oregon people.”40  Norma Paulus, the state Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
called the critiques “nonsense.”  “Standards will be higher, not lower, she says.  And 
students will be learning the basics while they develop skills such as teamwork, self-
directed learning and communication.”41  However, the greatest impediment to the 
success of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century was public misunderstanding.  
In 1995, four years after its passage, The Oregonian reported that many students and 
parents were unfamiliar with the reform.42 
 
The Standards Movement 
Meanwhile, another force was afoot in school reform, the standards movement.  
The standards movement was born out of research in cognitive science.  (Much of the 
assumptions of outcome-based learning also originated from these same cognitive 
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theories.)  As the focus of education moved from “access” to “achievement,” cognitive 
scientists developed new theories of how students learn that were used to improve 
instruction and assessment.  A leader in this field, Robert Glaser from the University of 
Pittsburgh, noted that in the past, tests had been used to limit access to education through 
admissions and tracking.  Instead, he argued that tests ought to be used to inform 
instruction, to find out what student had learned and why they missed some of what had 
been taught.  Glaser proposed that by analyzing and understanding student errors, 
teachers would better be able to adjust instruction and increase student learning.43 
During this period, cognitive scientists developed several principles that 
underpinned student learning.  First, student knowledge is “constructed” out of previous 
knowledge, personal experience, and understanding.  Second, previous knowledge is very 
important; the more students know, the more they can learn.  Next, assessments should be 
designed so that students can demonstrate learning through “exhibitions” of proficiency.  
Fourth, students learn best when they apply their learning to real world situations, when 
they work actively with others, and when they understand and can “think out loud” about 
their own learning process.  Last, skills cannot be taught in isolation; learning is “domain 
specific.”44   
Lauren Resnick, a colleague of Robert Glaser at the University of Pittsburgh, 
applied these principles to new assessment strategies.  She assumed that what was tested 
determined what teachers taught and therefore changing assessments would change the 
curriculum.  She argued that the current multiple-choice standardized tests, divorced from 
the curriculum, could not be used to assess learning and improve instruction.  Resnick 
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instead favored performance assessments such as portfolios or projects in which students 
demonstrated their learning and from which teachers adjusted their instruction.45  She 
recommended “external examinations in American schools as a way of raising and 
maintaining standards for all students and not only for very strong and very weak 
students.  Examinations coupled with publicized syllabi should guide the preparation of 
students in various subjects.”46  In other words, Resnick argued for performance 
assessments that evaluated specific content standards both for learning and instruction. 
In 1991, Resnick partnered with colleague Marc Tucker to found the New 
Standards Project, which aimed to design a nationwide examination system using 
performance assessments.  Together they assembled a group of 450 education policy-
makers and classroom teachers during the summer of 1991 to begin developing these 
tests.  Resnick believed that in order to create a sense of ownership, teachers had to be 
involved in the process of creating the assessments.  “The plan would allow regions to 
develop their own tests and grade them according to a national standard so that the result 
could be compared across the country.”47  In 1992, the New Standards Project piloted 
10,000 fourth grade performance assessments, which expanded to 50,000 fourth and 
eighth grade tests in 1993.  Education historian Diane Ravitch argued that the New 
Standards Project gave “legitimacy to the value of performance assessments as a way to 
encourage thoughtfulness and understanding, high standards for all children, external 
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examinations tied directly to the curriculum, and the involvement of teachers in a central 
role.”48 
Resnick and Spady influenced each other.  Both utilized cognitive science 
principles in understanding how students learn.  Both focused on using real-world 
performance assessments to demonstrate learning and maintain high expectations.  
However, while Resnick foresaw a national testing system mandated at set times, Spady 
argued for allowing students to demonstrate learning at their own pace.  Additionally, 
Resnick understood educational goals as domain-specific content standards, whereas 
Spady advocated broad interdisciplinary learning outcomes.  Nonetheless, the interplay 
was evident.  For example, it was clear that America’s Choice: High Skills or Low 
Wages! evolved from Spady’s outcome-based education through its use of time as a 
variable and performance demonstrations, and Resnick sat on the Commission on the 
Skills of the American Workforce, which produced the report.49  Similarly, Tucker, 
President of the National Center on Education and the Economy, the organization that 
published America’s Choice, partnered with Resnick to create the New Standards 
Project.50  In fact, the New Standards Project agreed to draft “the standards that could 
form the basis for awarding a certificate of initial mastery.”51  Though these policy 
heavyweights argued for different strategies of school reform, they operated from similar 
assumptions and built on one anothers’ ideas. 
In addition to growing movements for school reform originating in academia, the 
federal government also answered the call to action following A Nation at Risk.  After 
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declaring himself “the education president”52 during the 1988 campaign, President 
George H.W. Bush convened the nation’s governors at an education summit in 
Charlottesville, Virginia in 1989.  Led by Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, the governors 
agreed to adopt national education goals, a first step towards national standards and 
testing.  An optimistic Clinton declared, “This is the first time a President and governors 
have ever stood before the American people and said, not only are we going to set 
national performance goals, which are ambitious, not only are we going to develop 
strategies to achieve them, but we stand here before you and tell you we expect to be held 
personally accountable for the progress we make in moving this country to a brighter 
future.”53  Attending the meeting, AFT’s Shanker argued that national standards and 
testing could be developed without loss of teacher autonomy in the classroom and 
without a reliance on multiple-choice testing.  “We could all agree about the kind of book 
students at that level need to be able to read, the kind of essays they should be able to 
write, the math skills they should have.  And we could assess how well students meet 
these goals—with good tests instead of the idiotic, low-level multiple-choice test we now 
use.”54  The movement for national standards had begun. 
In April 1991 President Bush released his education plan entitled America 2000.  
Among other innovations, America 2000 planned to create national standards in each of 
the content areas: math, science, English, history and geography.55  The New York Times 
reported, “Bush also suggests…a more comprehensive national assessment system.  
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Since no single test can give an accurate picture of what individual students know, the 
Administration leans towards a combination of written tests, portfolios and performance 
on projects.”56  Shanker argued that these national tests needed to result in real-life 
consequences for students, as they do in some countries.  “Kids know they need to work 
hard because test scores determine whether or not they get into university or what kind of 
job they get.  This sounds harsh, but it is fairer than our system.  Everybody knows 
exactly what is required to succeed, so students can work towards this goal and teachers 
can help them.”57  It appeared as if the federal government would actually incentivize the 
creation of a national education system through investment in standards, testing, and 
model schools. 
Two formative examples of standards already existed from which the government 
could draw: the state of California and the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 
(NCTM).  In 1982, California elected Bill Honig as state superintendent of public 
instruction.  Although he took office as the effects of Proposition 13 began to impact 
schools, he sought to transform California public schools through systemic reform.  He 
raised expectations for graduation and convened committees of teachers and scholars to 
write new curricular frameworks, which became the state’s new content standards.  Other 
committees then developed new assessments based on those frameworks, which included 
both traditional and performance assessments.  Because teachers relied on textbooks, 
Honig pressured publishers to rewrite their them.  He often rejected initial changes as 
insubstantial; textbook publishers complied since California was such a large share of the 
market.  With these pieces in place, Honig then redesigned professional development to 
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train teachers in the use new standards, assessments, and resources.  Throughout this 
process, Honig communicated with parents and the general public about the changes 
taking place.58   
Honig demonstrated that “A successful improvement effort must do more than 
merely trot out a few new instructional techniques…[it] is complicated and hard, but it is 
the only way to produce the result being demanded…[it] depends on networking 
strategies that can organize large numbers of schools around a powerful idea for 
instructional improvement, provide assistance, and allow conversation.”59  Under Honig 
in the 1980s, the dropout rate declined, the number of students who took Advance 
Placement exams tripled, and the number of twelfth graders who met the University of 
California admission requirements increased by one-third.  Ravitch emphasized the 
significance of these achievements given the context of education in California: 
Those achievements were all the more remarkable because Honig’s era of reform 
coincided with an increase in student enrollment, a rapid expansion of immigrant 
and non-English speaking students, and a dramatic increase in the number of 
children living in poverty.  While enrollment exploded, state funding for 
education declined, dropping California’s expenditures well below national 
average and raising class sizes well above…He demonstrated that the model 
begins with a belief that all children can learn at high levels.  Three broad 
requirements are then necessary to achieve success: clear content standards, 
embodied in coherent statements of what students are expected to learn and do; 
changes in testing, professional development, textbooks, technology, and all the 
other parts of the educational system; and a long-term commitment to build 
support for the reform agenda in every school, so that teachers come to feel a 
sense of ownership in success.60 
 
The other successful example of standards-based reform came from the National 
Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM).  In 1986, NCTM organized teams of 
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teachers and scholars to draft mathematics standards and released the draft for discussion 
and review.  In 1988, the teams met again to revise the standards and published them the 
following year.  The new standards rejected traditional approaches to teaching math and 
instead favored a “dynamic discipline, one in which problem solving and meaning take 
precedence over computation, in which students are expected to solve open-ended 
problems that have more than one right answer, and in which the strategies that students 
use to solve problems are more important than the answer they reach.”61  Three years 
later, at least forty states used these math standards in their reform efforts.  Similar efforts 
to create content standards had been attempted by other disciplines, but math teachers 
alone agreed upon what should be taught and in which manner.  English, history, science 
and geography educators failed to reach consensus.62 
A comprehensive effort to create history standards came close to enacting an 
agreed-upon draft, had it not been for an attack from the right by Lynne Cheney, one of 
the primary funders of the effort when she chaired the National Endowment for the 
Humanities (NEH).  Beginning in 1992, the National Center for History in the Schools 
(NCHS) at UCLA, led by historian Gary Nash, received grants from the NEH and the 
Department of Education to develop national history standards.  Understanding the 
context of past controversies over teaching history, NCHS joined with the National 
Council for History Education and the Council of Chief School Officers, among others, 
to build consensus on draft standards.63  By the end of the summer in 1994, NCHS 
readied the drafts for publication.  Mary Bicouvaris, 1989 National Teacher of the Year, 
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saw the process as inclusive, collaborative, and consensus-driven.  “The army of 
participants in the process represented as broad a spectrum as one could expect to find in 
a project with limited time and resources, and the resulting national history standards are 
truly the product of their consensus.”64 
However, on October 20, 1994, Cheney wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal 
entitled “The End of History.” In it, she lambasted the not-yet-released standards as a 
liberal, left-wing, politically-correct revision of American history.  Cheney claimed that 
the “forces of political correctness” had been unleashed to impose their own version of a 
more inclusive American history.  “What got left out,” Cheney proclaimed, “was 
traditional history.”65  Right-wing conservative radio commentator Rush Limbaugh 
further attacked the standards as part of a multicultural conspiracy to bash America and 
create a “bastardization of American history.”66  It was not surprising that history 
produced the greatest controversies over standards.  As historian Nash understood, 
“History, like politics, is about national identity…History is unceasingly controversial 
because it provides so much of the substance for the way a society defines itself and 
considers what it wants to be.”67 
The attack exploded in the fall and winter of 1994-95 across newspapers and 
magazines, over the airwaves, in televised debates, and eventually in Congress. 68  In 
January 1995, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution condemning the standards created by 
NCHS and urged NESIC not to certify them.  Secretary of Education Richard Riley 
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disowned the standards.  “We have to acknowledge both the peaks and valleys in our 
past…but the message must be a positive one.  Our school should teach our students to be 
proud to be Americans.”69  After the “history war,” NCHS undertook efforts to revise the 
standards but without much effect.  History standards became a third rail; they were 
lethal.  Consequently, Ravitch noticed, “most states, however, having seen the 
controversy engendered by the history standards, continued to adopt minimal and vague 
social studies standards, with only cursory attention to history.”70 
Not all left-wing education policy advocates supported national standards and 
testing.  Jonathan Kozol, author of bestseller Savage Inequalities, which exposed the 
deterioration of public schools,71 did not oppose standards as a conception, but rather, 
“how and where they are determined, and by whom, and how they’re introduced, and 
how we treat or penalize (or threaten, or abuse) the child or the teacher who won’t 
swallow them.”72  He worried that “we’ll lose the teachers who come to the world of 
childhood with ministries of love and, in their place, we’ll get technicians of 
proficiency.”73  Educator Deborah Meier objected to the centralization and loss of local 
control; she believed schools should set their own standards and assessments.  She 
explained, “Our standards are intended to deepen and broaden young people’s habits of 
mind, their craftsmanship, and their work habits.  Other schools may select quite a 
different way of describing and exhibiting their standards.  But they too need to 
consciously construct their standards in ways that give schooling purpose and coherence, 
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and then commit themselves to achieving them.”74  Similarly, professor of education 
William Ayers argued that outside education experts should not be the ones creating 
standards.  “Standard setting, then, should not be the property of an expert class, the 
bureaucrats, or special interests.  Rather, standard setting should be part of the everyday 
vocation of schools and communities, the heart and soul of education and it should 
engage the widest public.”75  Furthermore, Theodore Sizer, founder of Coalition for 
Essential Schools, added that standards and testing missed the point for high school 
students.  “We Americans infantilize our older teenagers by holding them to the same 
sorts of routines and standards as those for the younger…We need a fundamental 
redefinition of the obligations a growing adolescent must accept for himself and for the 
community of which he is a part, and then of what structures will help him reach those 
obligations.  Most adolescents are eager to take responsibility.”76  These critics did not 
object to high expectations created by strict standards, but rather the process of their 
creation, adoption, and sanction.  They all advocated for a more just and democratic 
system that took into account the differences inherent in students and communities, 
which they feared a system of national standards and testing would overlook. 
Despite criticism, President Bush’s America 2000 set the standards wheel in 
motion by awarding grants to subject matter organizations, like NCTM, to begin writing 
voluntary national standards.  After the 1992 election, President Clinton continued to 
advance national standards and testing through his education legislation, Goals 2000: 
Educate America Act.  Goals 2000 aimed to create national standards by way of 
                                                
74 Meier in ibid., 22. 
75 Ayers in ibid., 65. 
76 Sizer in Meier, Cohen, and Rogers, Will Standards Save Public Education?. 
 85 
statewide reform.  It officially adopted seven education goals including “All children in 
America will start school ready to learn” as well as “All students will leave grades 4, 8, 
and 12 having demonstrated competency over challenging subject matter including 
English, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics, 
arts, history, and geography, and every school in American will ensure that all students 
learn to use their minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further 
learning, and productive employment in our nation’s modern economy.”77  In addition to 
these goals, Goals 2000 also established the National Education Standards and 
Improvement Council (NESIC) to certify national voluntary and state content and 
performance standards.  It created competitive federal grants available to states for the 
implementation of statewide school reform plans including the development of 
curriculum and assessments aligned with content and performance standards, the creation 
of professional development to increase teacher competency, and the promotion of safe 
conditions that foster a positive learning environment.  States would submit reform plans 
to NESIC, which would then be overseen by the new National Education Goals Panel.78  
Clinton’s Goals 2000 created the structure through which the standards movement could 
spread. 
 
From Outcomes to Standards in Oregon 
In February of 1995, Oregon’s school reform plan became the first to be approved 
by NESIC, receiving a federal grant of $4.1 million under the Goals 2000 legislation.  To 
                                                
77 United States and Department of Education, High Standards for All Students. (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Dept. of Education, 1994), 7. 
78 Mark Pitsch, “Clinton’s `Goals 2000’ Package Wins House Backing.,” Education Week 13, no. 7 
(October 20, 1993). 
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earn this award, a team of five educators from across the nation met with Oregon 
education officials, teachers, students and parents.79  In a visit to the state, Secretary of 
Education Riley noted that “Oregon is indeed in the forefront of education in this 
country…We can honestly say we are starting to turn the corner from a nation at risk to 
being a nation on the move, and I am seeing that here.”80   
Despite positive affirmation, Oregon’s school reform bill faced attacks from 
lawmakers, parents, teachers and community members.  As Michael Cohen, a Riley aide, 
remarked during the visit, “The whole notion of standards has been controversial…But 
one of the things the secretary is saying is that when we talk about setting standards, we 
are talking about academic standards.  That’s something that should not be political 
football.”81  The Oregon legislature had adopted outcomes for the Certificate of Initial 
Mastery, not content standards as the federal government insisted.  Ravitch, education 
historian, policy-maker, and advocate of standards during the 1990s, explained the 
difference: 
OBE sounds very much like standards, but the differences are significant.  Both 
OBE and standards start by identifying what students should know and be able to 
do and then work backward to construct a curriculum that will achieve the 
appropriate “outcomes.”  But there are three main differences.  First, content 
standards are clear and measurable.  OBE outcomes are so frequently vague that 
they are inherently unmeasurable.  Second, content standards focus on cognitive 
learning, while OBE outcomes may include not only cognitive learning but also 
affective skills, attitudes, and psychosocial behaviors.  Third, content standards 
are usually based on traditional academic disciplines, such as history, English, 
science, mathematics, civics, the arts, and geography.  OBE outcomes include 
some traditional academic disciplines but are mainly organized around 
interdisciplinary or nondisciplinary topics (such as “communications,” 
                                                
79 Steven Carter, “School Reform Plan Gets $4.1 Million,” The Oregonian, February 16, 1995, Fourth 
edition. 
80 Steven Carter, “Oregon School Reform Spending Gets OK,” The Oregonian, February 21, 1995, Fourth 
edition. 
81 Carter, “School Reform Plan Gets $4.1 Million.” 
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“environment and ecology,” “self-worth,” and “adaptability to change”).  Even 
the outcomes prescribed for academic subjects such as mathematics and science 
are stated in such generalities that provide little or not guidance to teachers, 
testmakers, or textbook writers.82 
 
Ravitch’s description of outcomes as interdisciplinary or non-disciplinary fit 
Oregon’s revised outcomes in 1994, which included foundation skills such as 
“communicate,” “self-direct learning,” and “quantify,” as well as core applications such 
as “deliberate on public issues,” “understand diversity,” and “apply science and math.”83  
As a result of the differences Ravitch indicated, Oregonians soured on the outcome-based 
education foundation of the state’s school reform.  Hearings prior to the 1995 session 
headlined “Legislative Sharks Rip School Reform Law” in The Oregonian.  “Critics said 
the standards were vague, subjective, and more oriented towards skills, attitudes and 
values than knowledge.”84 These objections, along with others such as the career decision 
following the Certificate of Initial Mastery after tenth grade, the reliance on portfolios 
over traditional tests and grades, the timeline for implementation, and the loss of local 
school control, led many to call for revision or repeal of the law.  The Oregonian editorial 
board recommended that the state should revise the law to reflect “the legitimate concern 
of parents and others about the fluffiness of the state’s educational outcomes or learning 
standards.  The goals and standards should be rigorous, specific and definable, 
emphasizing both content and the manipulation of knowledge—in short, academics—and 
eliminating attitudinal outcomes.”85  Chairman of the Senate Education Committee, 
                                                
82 Ravitch, National Standards in American Education, 163. 
83 Oregon Department of Education, “Certificate of Initial Mastery Standard Statements” (Oregon 
Department of Education, 1994). 
84 Bill Graves, “Legislative Sharks Rip School Reform Law,” The Oregonian, February 1, 1995, Fourth 
edition. 
85 “Reform School Reform,” The Oregonian, March 7, 1995, Fourth edition. 
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Senator Tom Hartung, D-Portland, predicted, “I would be amazed if [the Oregon 
Educational Act for the 21st Century] comes through the ’95 session in its present form.”  
It did not. 
In the 1995 spring session the Oregon Legislature passed House Bill 2991, which 
revised the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, beginning what became an 
ongoing process.  While the House initially eliminated the Certificate of Initial Mastery 
and Certificate of Advanced Mastery completely in favor of a “certificate of 
accomplishment,”86 the Senate-House conference committee retained the CIM and CAM 
while delaying their implementation from 1996-97 until 1998-99.87  It made issuing the 
certificates optional, reasserting the supremacy of traditional high school diplomas.  The 
bill allowed schools to return to graduating students based on seat time and course credits 
over performance and portfolio-based certificates.88  The legislators also revised 
educational outcomes to content standards for traditional academic subjects such as 
English, math, science and history.  State Superintendent Paulus explained, “The 
legislature removed the fuzzy language that some people were 
misinterpreting…[Instead,] it spelled out very specifically the high academic standards 
we are trying to reach.”89  This postponement ensured that the Certificate of Initial 
Mastery never went into effect.  In 1995 Oregon’s school reform plan pivoted from 
outcomes-based to standards-based. 
                                                
86 Steven Carter, “School Reform Faces Tests,” The Oregonian, April 1, 1995, Fourth edition. 
87 Steven Carter, “Compromise Delays School Reforms,” The Oregonian, June 3, 1995, Fourth edition; 
Lynn Olson, “Straying from the Trail?,” Education Week 16, no. 17 (January 23, 1997): 190. 
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Education Week 14, no. 38 (June 14, 1995): 17. 
89 Olson, “Straying from the Trail?”. 
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In 1996, the state developed, reviewed, revised and adopted state academic 
content standards.90  Instead of eleven cross-disciplinary outcomes divided by foundation 
skills and core applications, the new standards reverted to traditional separations into six 
subject area: mathematics, science, English, social sciences, second languages, and the 
arts.  To illustrate this, one can compare Oregon’s CIM goals in 1994 and 1996 around 
what students should understand about the U.S. Constitution.  A 1994 CIM outcome for 
“deliberate on public issues” stated that a student must consistently “show deliberation 
skills across a broad range of issues including…application of democratic principles 
including those embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in action proposals 
relative to public policy issues involving the United States and its citizens.  Such 
principles include, but are not limited to law, common good, individual rights, minority 
rights, and compromise.”91  In contrast, a 1996 CIM benchmark in civics from the subject 
area of “social sciences” stated that a student must be able to “analyze contemporary and 
historical challenges to the U.S. Constitution and their resolutions” and “explain how the 
rule of law is designed to protect individual rights and serve the common good.” 92 
Both statements required students to understand the U.S. Constitution in historical 
context, with particular attention to controversies over rights.  However, while the 1994 
statement fell under the domain of “deliberate on public issues,” which was not 
specifically delegated to a subject area teacher, it is clear that the civics teacher ought to 
maintain ownership for teaching the 1996 statement under “social sciences.”  Another 
                                                
90 Bill Graves, “Education Board Approves Set of Standards,” The Oregonian, April 19, 1996, Sunrise 
edition. 
91 Oregon Department of Education, “Certificate of Initial Mastery Standard Statements.” 
92 Oregon Department of Education, “Certificate of Advanced Mastery Standards: First Draft Review” 
(Oregon Department of Education, May 1996), 10. 
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contrast rested in the skills the statements required students to demonstrate.  While the 
1994 outcome asked students to “show deliberation skills” by applying “democratic 
principles” the 1996 standard asked them to “analyze…challenges” and “explain.”  
“Analyze” and “explain” used words more comprehensible to the general public, whereas 
applying democratic principles to show deliberation skills represented what Paulus meant 
by “fuzzy language.”93  Consequently, while both outcomes and standards focused on 
virtually the same content, it became clearer and more concrete in the 1996 standards 
statements, which specified precisely what students were expected to know and be able to 
do, as well as whose responsibility it was to teach it to them. 
Not surprisingly, the state legislature continued to revise and postpone the Oregon 
Educational Act for the 21st Century during the second half of the decade.  In 1997, the 
legislature voted to delay implementation of the Certificate of Advanced Mastery until 
the 2004-05 school year.  In 1999, it further postponed the creation of some standards and 
relaxed the foreign language requirement.94  In 2001, U.S. Congress passed President 
George W. Bush’s education legislation, No Child Left Behind, and again changed the 
game as significantly as had his father a decade earlier with America 2000.95  At this 
intersection, Oregon’s school reform yet again took a different turn. 
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Chapter Three: Shifting Schooling 
 
Changes in school funding and school reform shifted dramatically and 
independently of each other over the course of the 1990s.  For classrooms in Oregon, the 
passage of Measure 5 in November 1990 and the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st 
Century seven months later produced a sudden metamorphosis of schooling in the state.  
How did schools in Oregon change over the decade and how did teachers, schools, and 
districts meet the demands incurred by the new legislation? 
In short, while changes in school funding affected districts differently across the 
state, teachers had similar experiences with school reform. In terms of school funding, 
Measure 5 created a divide between urban school districts with wealthy tax bases and 
rural school districts that had struggled to pass levies sufficient to fund their schools.  
After the property tax limitation and equalization took effect, wealthy urban districts 
faced years of cuts while cash-strapped rural districts experienced an influx of funds.  
However, despite differences in funding, when Oregon teachers confronted the 
implementation of the Certificate of Initial Mastery (CIM) and the Certificate of 
Advanced Mastery (CAM), they reacted similarly because of their shared values and 
beliefs about teaching and learning. 
To understand the compound effects of the tax revolt and school reform on 
classrooms, this chapter examines two school districts, one wealthy and urban, Portland 
Public Schools (PPS), and one poor and rural, Nyssa School District.  PPS, the state’s 
largest district in the city of Portland, served approximately 55,000 students in 90 school 
buildings during the 1990s.  In contrast, Nyssa School District, a small rural district on 
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the eastern border of Oregon with Idaho, served approximately 1,200 students in just 
three buildings: Nyssa Elementary School, Nyssa Middle School, and Nyssa High 
School.  While PPS spent $6,283 per pupil prior to Measure 5, Nyssa spent just $3,610.1  
This chapter’s comparison of the two districts identified similarities and differences 
between urban and rural districts’ experiences with school funding and reform throughout 
Oregon.  Published materials tell part of the story through statistics, newspaper articles, 
and government reports, but they often fail to zoom in at the classroom level.  Oral 
history interviews with teachers at Franklin High School in Portland and Nyssa High 
School in Nyssa during the 1990s presented teachers’ experiences through a different 
lens: they tell how school funding and curriculum reform affected classrooms.2 
Although school funding in these districts differed because of size, location, and 
wealth, teachers recounted their experiences with school reform in the 1990s in similar 
ways.  In the interviews, they expressed shared values about teaching and learning.  They 
saw themselves as craftsmen, not assembly line workers, and sought to improve their 
schools through collaborative curriculum alignment and development.  On the whole, 
teachers embraced the outcome-based education reform from 1991-1995, but when it 
shifted to standards and testing, teachers disengaged from active implementation.  
Teachers felt that testing excessively drove the curriculum and they no longer had 
professional development time to collaborate on aligning the reform.  The initial 
outcome-based reform trusted teachers as professionals, using a top-down bottom-up 
                                                
1 “District Profile Comparison Report for Nyssa Sch Dist 26, Portland Sch Dist 1J, 1997-1998 School 
Year,” District Profile Comparison, Oregon Department of Education, (1998 1997), 
http://www.ode.state.or.us/sfda/reports/r0064rpt.asp; Brian Reeder, “State and District Comparison, 1989-
1999” (Oregon Department of Education, 2014).  Figures from 1989-90 school year and adjusted for 
inflation using 1990 dollars. 
2 See discussion of methodology in introduction and short biographies of the participants in the Appendix. 
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implementation strategy, while the standards-based reform utilized a top-down model, 
eliminating teachers from the implementation process. 
In the oral history interviews, teachers focused more on the effects of school 
reform than on the effects of school funding.  This indicated that they engaged those 
areas that they could control, such as curriculum planning and course alignment, rather 
than focusing on issues beyond their influence, such as class size, which was determined 
by school funding, an area in which teachers had no say.  This is not to say that teachers 
overlooked the significance of the structure of education—the courses offered, the 
number of students in a class, or their individual teaching assignments—but rather that 
they had no control over that structure.  In fact, in the oral history interviews, teachers 
highlighted the importance of the student-teacher relationship, elective courses, and job 
security in evaluating the success of the school system.  But on a day-to-day basis, 
teachers worked to shape the curriculum within their classrooms because this was within 
their control.  They appreciated the initial outcome-based reform and disliked the shift to 
standards-based reform because, in an environment in which teachers faced limited 
control over the parameters of their work, standardization and testing greatly curtailed 
their autonomy and professionalism.  Teachers engaged in school reform when it 
empowered them as change agents. 
 
The Effects of Measure 5 and Equalization 
Measure 5 and the new school funding equalization formula, which equalized 
statewide per-pupil distribution of funds across the state, impacted districts according to 
their size and relative wealth.  Though school districts generally favored equalization, the 
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School Funding Coalition, which developed the school funding formula, debated the 
merits of the new weighting system.  Urban and rural districts did manage to find 
common ground on shared issues such as the increase of English language learner 
students.  In a 2014 interview, Nyssa School District Superintendent Dennis Savage 
explained that, because demographic changes impacted urban and rural areas alike, he 
was able to work with Matthew Prophet, the Portland Public Schools Superintendent, to 
fight for the weights distributed to students for English as a Second Language. 
Fortunately, one of the larger districts, Portland, kind of had the same problems 
that Nyssa had—they had ESL [English as a Second Language] kids.  We had one 
language ESL and they had 137 languages.  They needed the money for them…I 
remember Matthew Prophet was a Portland superintendent.  “You people don’t 
understand.  Nyssa and Portland need that money for those kids.”  So we had the 
support of the biggest school district in Oregon at that time.3   
 
However, not all superintendents saw eye-to-eye on these issues.  Savage recalled,  
The meetings that we had you could almost see the smoke come out of the room.  
Very, very emotional meetings with superintendents.  Things were said that made 
sense to some, and made no sense to others.  Things like, “You don't understand.  
People don't want to live in Eastern Oregon.  They want to live in Western 
Oregon.  We need the money there for that.”  Other people would say, “You don't 
understand.  In a big district houses cost more, so you have to pay teachers more, 
so we need more money.  You don't need the money.  You guys live in tents, so 
you don't need money.”  And truly, a lot of hard feelings at times, but we survived 
it.  We came up with a formula and the state approved it. 
 
While avenues for cooperation opened between rural and urban districts, resentments 
existed.  The equalization funding formula ensured equitable per pupil spending across 
the state.  Like Measure 5 itself, the formula essentially leveled down wealthy districts 
while adding funds to poor districts, incrementally creating parity by the end of the 
decade.  Savage concluded, “Every child will have the same shake, and that's good.” 
                                                
3 Savage, Oral History Interview of Dennis Savage. 
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Despite alliances over common issues such as ESL, Measure 5 and equalization 
affected Portland and Nyssa school districts differently.  The new school funding formula 
combined with the tax limitation created a system of winners and losers.  While Portland 
Public Schools had to reduce services as the property tax limitation ratcheted down, 
Nyssa received unprecedented funds. Prior to Measure 5, according to Savage, Nyssa 
levied property taxes in equal proportion from the city, farmers, and the Amalgamated 
Sugar Company.  The state also added some funding to support Nyssa schools since it 
was such a poor district.  As Savage explained, “When you wanted anything that would 
be extra, you'd have to go for a levy, which, in districts that were poor—and Nyssa was a 
poor school district—was pretty hard to get anything passed, almost impossible.  It 
wasn’t because people were bad; it was, first of all, most school boards wouldn’t put out 
a levy.  ‘We’re giving you all we can and so learn to live with what you got.’  And we 
did.  We were real tight.”4  Once equalization began, Nyssa was able to increase capital 
expenses and invest in supports for students.  An Oregonian article aptly titled, “It Cuts 
Both Ways,” reported, “Nyssa School District students last week climbed into new buses 
to return to schools with new computers, a new baseball field and expanded music 
programs.  They have counselors, tutoring services, and educational options they never 
had before.  Nyssa…has seen its budget swell by 69 percent since…1990.”5  Measure 5 
and equalization created a system of winners and losers; poor rural districts like Nyssa 
benefited. 
Meanwhile, Portland Public Schools spent much of the decade reducing its budget 
and eliminating programs, departments, and employees.  It cut programs for at-risk 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Bill Graves, “It Cuts Both Ways,” The Oregonian, September 4, 1994, Fourth edition. 
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students; centers for talented and gifted students; drug and alcohol specialists; summer 
school; supplies for music, art, and other electives; textbook adoptions; technical, 
business, vocational, and career education; athletics and extracurricular activities; district 
administrative departments; and most critically, teachers, administrators, and school 
staff.6  By 1996-97 when Measure 5 was fully implemented, per student spending 
decreased to $4,654 from $6,283 per student in 1989-90 (in inflation-adjusted 1990 
dollars).  In contrast, Nyssa School District spent $3,610 per student in 1989-90 and by 
1996-97 per student spending had jumped to $4,225.  Nyssa added programs and 
positions during the decade; meanwhile Portland cut and cut. 
 
Figure 4 Dollars Per Student 1989-19967 
 
  
                                                
6 Gordon Oliver, “School District Faces $8.1 Million in Cuts,” The Oregonian, April 14, 1992, Fourth 
edition; Erin Hoover Schraw, “Portland Schools Emerge Battered from Budget Gantlet,” The Oregonian, 
May 16, 1993, Fourth edition. 
7 Reeder, “State and District Comparison, 1989-1999.” 
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Table 7 Portland Public School Budget Cuts 1991-95 
Portland Public School Budget Cuts 1991-1995 
School Year, 
Budget Shortfall, 
Measure 5 Limit 
A Sampling of Budget Cuts 
1991-92 
$5.3 Million 
$15 per $1000 
• Eliminated tutoring programs for at-risk students 
• Eliminated counseling for at-risk students8 
1992-93 
$8.1 Million 
$12.50 per $1000 
 
 
• Eliminated programs for at-risk students at elementary schools 
• Reduced funding for discipline programs at high schools 
• Reduced funding for multicultural/multiethnic programs 
• Drastically reduced funding for teen parenting programs and child care 
• Reduced summer school funding 
• Reduced funding for vocational, technical and career education 
• Eliminated funding for musical instrument purchases 
• Reduced funding for alcohol and drug programs, including 10 half-time positions 
• Reduced funding for business education programs 
• Reduced funding for desegregation programs at elementary schools 
• Eliminated new textbook purchases 
• Reduced curriculum development9 
1993-94 
$42.1 Million 
$10 per $1000 
• Eliminated 2 school days 
• Eliminated summer school 
• Eliminated about 400 employees, including 72% of special education social 
workers 
• Reduced funding for athletics and extracurricular activities 
• Created new participation fees for athletics and clubs 
• Closed talented and gifted centers and reduced funding for the program 
• Drastically reduced curriculum and evaluation departments at district office 
• Cut school supply budget by 50% 
• Reduced field trips10 
1994-95 
$21 Million 
$7.50 per $1000 
• Eliminated curriculum department 
• Reduced directors of instruction 
• Reduced bussing 
• Eliminated some sports including swimming, golf, and tennis 
• Eliminated stipends for club supervision 
• Eliminated employees (in all, 661 since 1991)11 
1995-96 
$1 Million12 
$5 per $1000 
• Reduced ending fund balance 
• Eliminated cost of living increase for employees 
• Deferred building and equipment maintenance13 
                                                
8 Bill Graves, “Educators Apprehensive on Schools’ Opening Day,” The Oregonian, September 3, 1991, 
Fourth edition. 
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11 Janet Christ, “Metro Portland Back to Class,” The Oregonian, September 1, 1994, Fourth edition. 
12 Steven Carter, “Portland Schools Face $1 Million Shortfall,” The Oregonian, June 8, 1995, Fourth 
edition. 
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Between 1990 and 1996 PPS cut over 1,000 jobs.  For the 1996-97 school year, 
Portland received $4,654 per student from the state, $400 less than it received in 1991, 
the first year of the state funding formula.  And yet, by 1996 full equalization had not yet 
been completed throughout the state; Portland looked ahead to years of flat funding 
without adjustments for inflation, health care increases, or salary costs, which in real 
terms translated to further budget reductions.14  Between the 1989-90 and 1999-00 school 
years, the number of full time equivalent (FTE) teachers decreased by 60 while students’ 
average daily membership (ADM) increased by 893 students.  In contrast, when Nyssa 
students’ ADM increased by 148, the number of FTE teachers actually increased by 19.15  
By the end of the decade, the best headline The Oregonian could muster was, “Most 
Schools Won’t Have to Make Cuts,” although “The biggest exception is Portland—the 
state’s largest district with 56,000 students—which faces an estimated $14 million in cuts 
over the next two years.”16  These budget reductions significantly reshaped education in 
the district for students and teachers. 
Table 8 Differences between districts, 1989-99 
Differences between districts 
1989-90 to 1999-0017 
Portland Public 
Schools 
Nyssa School District 
1989-90 1999-00 1989-90 1999-00 
Average Daily Membership (ADM) 48,007 48,900 1,052 1,200 
Operating Revenue per ADM* $6,283 $6,173 $3,610 $5,628 
Teacher Full Time Equivalent (FTE) 2,945 2,886 61 80 
Student Teacher Ratio 18.0 18.6 18.4 15.1 
*Adjusted for inflation using 1990 dollars     
                                                
14 Steven Carter, “Shift in School Funding to State Means Winners, Losers,” The Oregonian, June 25, 
1996, Sunrise edition. 
15 Reeder, “State and District Comparison, 1989-1999.” 
16 Bill Graves and Steven Carter, “Most Schools Won’t Have to Make Cuts,” The Oregonian, July 27, 
1999, Street Final edition. 
17 Reeder, “State and District Comparison, 1989-1999.” 
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Budget cuts created a climate of uncertainty and insecurity; teachers didn’t know 
from year to year if they’d have a job or what they’d be teaching.  This made it a 
challenge to develop programs or improve instruction long-term.  As Measure 5 began to 
take effect in 1991, Franklin High School in Portland hired Sandra Childs, a social 
studies and English teacher.  Her experience in her first years of teaching reflected a 
common pattern.   
Because of the instability of funding and what was going on, I was [hired as] 
temporary, so they would fire me in the spring.  And then in August when they 
had a better sense of their numbers, they would pull me back.  They did that for 
four years.  And because at that point they had already built the schedule, I'm the 
pick up girl.  And I'm in two subjects, so I would have four different preps and 
teach five classes those four years.  When I left the classroom the first time I had 
five fully packed file cabinets, because I had taught everything in the social 
studies department and every level in English.  Which at the time, I sort of…and 
now I'm like, are you kidding me?  [Laughs]  How did I not burn out?  I don't 
know.18 
 
Lewis and Clark College education professor Greg Smith uncovered a similar pattern in a 
1995 comparison of two Portland metro area schools.  “This sense of not knowing what 
the future holds weighs heavily on educators…Another consequence of long-term 
funding uncertainty is its impact on people’s ability to move towards shared goals.”19  
This instability taxed teachers. 
 
Class Size 
Class size also changed schooling as a direct result of school funding.  Nyssa used 
increasing state funds to hire more teachers and reduce class size.  Former superintendent 
                                                
18 Childs, Oral History Interview of Sandra Childs. 
19 Gregory A. Smith, “Living with Oregon’s Measure 5: The Costs of Property Tax Relief in Two Suburban 
Elementary Schools,” The Phi Delta Kappan 76, no. 6 (February 11, 1995): 455. 
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Savage explained, “When I was in elementary school [as principal], I closed one 
elementary building because we didn't have the money.  Then I had put 36 kids in a 
classroom, [including] my own child.  Now we were able to get down to 18 in a 
classroom and hire a half-time aid or a full-time aid in the younger grades because of that 
Ballot Measure 5.”  He added, “It was a blessing for poor districts.  I understand some 
larger districts struggled with that.”20  Measure 5 and equalization allowed Nyssa School 
District to reduce classes from the mid-thirties down to around twenty students per class.  
ODE reported that in 1997-98, following the full implementation of Measure 5, 
elementary class size in Nyssa averaged 20.7 students, whereas Portland averaged 26 
students per class.21  At the high school level, a similar gap existed in class size between 
school districts.  While Nyssa was able to lower class size by hiring more teachers, 
Portland’s class size increased as it laid off teachers.22   
Table 9 Average Class Size by Subject and School, 1997-98 
Average Class Size by Subject and School, 1997-98 School Year 
 Nyssa School District 
Nyssa High School 
Portland School District 
Franklin High School 
District Enrollment 1,229 55,321 
School Enrollment 289 1,564 
Math 14 32 
Science 15 26 
English 21 28 
Social Studies 21 29 
Second Language 13 27 
 
                                                
20 Savage, Oral History Interview of Dennis Savage. 
21 “District Profile Comparison.” 
22 “Average Class Size by Secondary School for Nyssa SD 26, Portland SD 1J, 1997-1998 School Year,” 
Average Class Size by Secondary School, Oregon Department of Education, (1998 1997), 
http://www.ode.state.or.us/sfda/reports/r0038Select2.asp. 
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Student teacher ratio is another, albeit less accurate, measure of class size.  
Student teacher ratio measures the ratio of all students to all teachers.  However, because 
this includes specialty teachers, for example teachers of physically handicapped students 
who attend small classes, it does not accurately reflect class size for the majority of 
mainstream students.  Nonetheless, student teacher ratio is often used as a comparator.  In 
the 1990s, University of Oregon economics professor David Figlio wrote two articles 
about the short-term effect of the tax revolt on school performance.  The first, published 
in 1997, evaluated 49 states to compare school performance in states that had passed a tax 
limitation to states that had not.  He concluded that states with a tax limitation had 6.4% 
higher student teacher ratios and that the gap between these two groups continued to 
widen.  Essentially, “‘money mattered’ in the production of education.  All else equal, 
students in schools subject to limitations perform consistently less well than students in 
schools without limits.”23  In his second article Figlio examined Measure 5’s effect on 
school service levels in Oregon, using the state of Washington, which did not enact a tax 
limitation, as the control.  He found that, prior to Measure 5, Oregon had a lower student 
teacher ratio than Washington, whereas after Measure 5, Oregon’s student teacher ratio 
exceeded that of Washington, leading Figlio to conclude that Measure 5 did in fact lower 
service levels at Oregon schools.  “If the goal of a property tax limit is to provide the 
same level of educational services, but with lower administrative overhead, my results 
suggest that property tax limits are not likely to achieve that goal.”24   
 
                                                
23 Figlio, “Did the ‘Tax Revolt’ Reduce School Performance?,” 265. 
24 Figlio, “Short-Term Effects of a 1990s-Era Property Tax Limit,” 68. 
 102 
Table 10 Student Teacher Ratio by State 
Student Teacher Ratio (mean) 
School Years Oregon Washington 
1987-1991 19.2 20.4 
1991-1993 20.9 20.4 
 
Between 1990 and 1996, statewide student enrollment in Oregon’s public schools 
had grown by 9% while the number of teachers grew by only 2%, resulting in larger class 
sizes across the state.  The Oregonian noted, “School leaders say they can’t fix this 
problem without more money to hire more teachers.  They praise their teachers for 
bearing unreasonable loads.” 25  While districts leveled down as a result of Measure 5 and 
equalization, teachers bore a great deal of this burden.  The Oregonian reported, “While 
giving teachers more students, financially strapped districts have cut back on the kind of 
support that makes life easier for them—curriculum specialists for help in planning, 
counselors to deal with problem children, special education teachers to work with 
students who have learning disabilities.”  To attempt to shield cuts from classrooms, 
districts like Portland prioritized these support services for reduction or elimination 
before teachers.  Consequently, as class size rose, “Teachers with large class loads 
uniformly say they spend more time managing and less educating.  They worry they 
cannot adequately teach each child.”  As one teacher in Portland exclaimed, “I didn’t get 
into this profession to be a baby sitter.”26 
Larger classes increased discipline issues.  Theresa Hawkins, a business teacher at 
Franklin High School, recalled that the increased discipline issues deducted 
                                                
25 Bill Graves, “Educators Need to Learn Lessons About Relieving Crowding,” The Oregonian, March 10, 
1996, Sunrise edition. 
26 Steven Carter, “Teachers Stretched Thin by Expanding Classes,” The Oregonian, March 4, 1996, Sunrise 
edition; “Classrooms Already Overcrowded,” The Oregonian, November 24, 1993, Fourth edition. 
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administrators’ time with teachers and curriculum.  “Everybody in the office and the 
administration was stretched so thin dealing with increased discipline issues and 
increased attendance issues.”  She attributed much of this increase to the difficulty 
teachers faced in building meaningful relationships with individual students when 
overloaded with class sizes.  This loss of one-on-one attention fractured the classroom 
and school community.  In his comparison of two schools following Measure 5, Smith 
concluded, “This reduction in their ability to ‘touch children’ hurts teachers deeply.  They 
know that youngsters who remained disconnected from and distrustful of adults run the 
risk of falling afoul of society and ending up in prison.”27  Larger class sizes allowed 
more students to fall through the cracks. 
Every teacher interviewed described the student teacher relationship as the 
bedrock of teaching.  Nyssa teachers described how smaller classes allowed them to 
know each student.  “Teaching in a small town, you do get to know the students rather 
well.  You don’t just know the student, but you also know the parents…[so you’re able 
to] meet every student’s needs as much as possible.”28  Similarly, Franklin English 
teacher Manuel Mateo noted, “I realized that everyone’s background, and the 
backgrounds they come from really influence how they look at the world, and as a 
consequence, I’d like to give everyone the best opportunity for getting a quality education 
while they’re with me.”29  At the same time, individuals from both districts argued that 
there existed an inverse correlation between class size and student teacher relationships.  
Savage noted that the reason he used the extra funding to reduce class size was “better 
                                                
27 Smith, “Living with Oregon’s Measure 5,” 459–460. 
28 Smith, Oral History Interview of Christiane Smith. 
29 Mateo, Oral History Interview of Manuel Mateo. 
 104 
relationships…When you had a decent class size and you know you're getting help…The 
teachers do a better job and the kids learn more.  I’d say it’s all connected.”30  
Conversely, Mateo lamented, “It’s a lot of time to get to know someone and to remediate 
what skills they’re lacking and to help out.  And, with larger and larger classes, that 
means I devote less and less time to students.”31  As class size increased, teachers 
struggled to build relationships and meet the needs of individual students. 
Larger class size also increased teachers’ workload.  By a very practical measure, 
Mateo revealed that, “as a teacher, when I have overloaded classes and I’m assigning 
essays, it means I have to read those things.  And so therefore, there’s less time teaching 
and more time grading papers.”  This economic speed-up led many teachers to burn out, 
leave the profession, or retire.  In 1996, The Oregonian reported, “Anne W. Terry, a 
Salem high school English teacher, spends as many as 20 hours a weekend reading and 
grading papers.  With 143 students and a workload that keeps rising, she is quitting at the 
end of the school year after 31 years in the profession.”  Her reason: “I can’t take the 
workload.”32  In his study of Measure 5’s effects, Smith warned, “The impatience, 
inflexibility, and withdrawal that can accompany burnout leave in their wake long-term 
scars on children, who may internalize a teacher’s lack of support and assume that they 
have caused the problem.”33   
The assertion that increased class size negatively impacted student achievement 
and effective teaching did not simply arise from teacher complaints about workload, 
                                                
30 Savage, Oral History Interview of Dennis Savage. 
31 Mateo, Oral History Interview of Manuel Mateo. 
32 Carter, “Teachers Stretched Thin by Expanding Classes.” 
33 Smith, “Living with Oregon’s Measure 5,” 460;  See also Conley and Goldman, “Reactions from the 
Field to State Restructuring Legislation.” 
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budget cuts, or mandates; academic research supports the claim.  In a research review 
published by the National Education Policy Center, Professor Diane Whitmore 
Schanzenbach of Northwestern University concluded, “Class size matters.  Research 
supports the common-sense notion that children learn more and teachers are more 
effective in smaller classes.”  She asserted that class size determined student outcomes 
not only in the short-term, but also students’ human capital formation in later life, and 
that low-income and minority students benefited most from class size reduction.  Small 
classes, she explained, allowed teachers to use a variety of strategies to meet students’ the 
individual needs.  “For example, they closely monitored the progress of student learning 
in their classes, were able to re-teach using alternative strategies when children did not 
learn a concept, had excellent organizational skills, and maintained superior personal 
interactions with their students.”  These strategies worked to create higher levels of 
student engagement and increased time on task.  Although earlier studies suggested that 
class size reduction was effective only if reduced to less than twenty, Schanzenbach 
countered, “The broader pattern in the literature finds positive impacts from class size 
reductions using variation across a wider range of class sizes… that is, from roughly 15 
to 40 students per class.”34   
 
  
                                                
34 Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Does Class Size Matter? (Boulder, CO: National Education Policy 
Center, February 2014), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/pb_-_class_size.pdf.   
It should be noted that while this research review was published in 2014, to date, the most valid and reliable 
experiment conducted on class size remains Tennessee’s Student Teacher Achievement Ratio, which took 
place between 1985-1990 and published in 1990.  Consequently, Oregonians had access to these findings 
during the Measure 5 era. 
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The Effects of School Reform 
Because of budget pressures following Measure 5, school districts criticized the 
Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century for the additional investments it required.  
Many districts struggled to find the money for the new reforms.  “No one argues that 
some features of the plan clearly would cost more and must be postponed,” The 
Oregonian asserted.  For example, lengthening the school year, expanding early 
childhood education centers, creating new learning centers, and even hiring enough 
foreign language teachers required significant state investment to become a reality.  
Reformers argued that other features of the law could be implemented without significant 
new funding, such as mixed-age groupings, career pathway community partnerships, 
portfolios, and common assessment rubrics.35  In a 1992-93 survey of 2000 Oregon 
teachers, education researchers David T. Conley and Paul Goldman discovered that 
“Teachers express skepticism that the act can be implemented without additional targeted 
funding to buy the time and expertise they perceive as necessary for their own training, 
learning and changing.  …Educators in this study express a willingness to entertain 
change, but do not believe they will necessarily be given the authority or resources they 
need to adapt successfully.”36  To that end, the Oregon Department of Education agreed 
to an additional $11 million in 1994-95 for teacher training and professional 
development, but most agreed that at some point the tax limits “will dim prospects for 
even the zealous reformers to improve schools.”37  Teachers predicted those additional 
                                                
35 Bill Graves, “Can State Afford Required School Reforms?,” The Oregonian, February 6, 1994, Fourth 
edition. 
36 Conley and Goldman, “Reactions from the Field to State Restructuring Legislation,” 532. 
37 Graves, “Can State Afford Required School Reforms?”. 
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funds provided for implementation of CIM would disappear as school funding declined 
because of the tax limitation. 
Insufficient funding, the debate between outcomes-based and standards-based 
education, and ultimately the passage of No Child Left Behind in 2001 (which focused 
less on standards and more on testing), ended Oregon’s experiment with school reform.  
The Certificate of Initial Mastery was never implemented as it was written in 1991; in 
1995 it shifted from performance assessments driven by outcomes to standards evaluated 
by standardized tests.  Issuing the certificate itself became optional for schools.  The 
Certificate of Advanced Mastery, perpetually postponed, never came into existence, 
though many districts and schools began their own programs based on the intended goals.  
As David Boyer, an art teacher in Nyssa, recalled, “They pushed [CIM] really hard.  I 
didn't know it was going to go away.  But it did.  And the CAM went away.  I thought the 
CAM was really cool and it seemed to go really well with what I did anyway—I didn't 
have to learn new stuff, I just kinda had to twist it and make it work.  I liked it, and it 
went away.”38   
Although many teachers enthusiastically approached the CIM and CAM, they 
also saw this as the next greatest fad in education.  Christiane Smith, an English teacher 
in Nyssa explained, 
I don't know why, but it seems as if teachers are very eager to make changes.  I've 
been in education for almost thirty years; every five years there’s something new 
that comes on and everybody jumps on that bandwagon…And then there’s 
changes made, and this is going to be the solution to the problem.  Ultimately, it 
isn’t, because we don’t give it enough time to see if it works out.  Because by the 
time five years is over, we do something new.  The CIM and CAM is a good 
example of that.  There was a lot of time and effort and money spent developing 
that.  And yet, I honestly think, it hasn’t remained in place long enough to really 
                                                
38 Boyer, Oral History Interview of David Boyer. 
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see if it makes any difference.  Any statistical change of improvement or lack of 
improvement isn’t going to show up in two years…Developing all those CIM and 
CAM standards, there was a lot of time and effort put into it and I’m not sure how 
the CIM and CAM worked out.39 
 
Regardless of whether Oregon’s experiment with the CIM and CAM would be left in 
place long enough to determine if its strategy produced positive results, teachers 
nonetheless had to go through the motions of implementing this continually-changing 
reform.   
While Measure 5 and equalization affected districts differently, school reform 
affected teachers in similar ways.  Across the state, districts hurried to fulfill the school 
reform law.  Districts adopted blended classrooms, block scheduling, authentic 
performance assessments, collection of portfolios, and statewide rubrics.  Some schools 
began working towards granting Certificates of Initial Mastery long before it was 
required.  Some began new career programs and community internships driven by the 
structure laid out in the Certificate of Advanced Mastery.  Although implemented 
unevenly across the state, teachers shared common experiences with the reform 
regardless of district, size, or location. 
The state’s implementation strategy explained the shared experiences of teachers 
with the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century.  The state approached the 
implementation from top-down and bottom-up.  While the state set mandates about 
expectations for the implementation, it granted teachers autonomy and time to collaborate 
to transform their individual departments, schools, and districts.  University of Toronto 
education professor Michael Fullan argued that this top-down bottom-up approach 
worked best to implement reform.  “Combined strategies that capitalize on the center’s 
                                                
39 Smith, Oral History Interview of Christiane Smith. 
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strengths (to provide prospective direction, incentives, networking, and retrospective 
monitoring) and locals’ capacities (to lean, create, respond to, and contribute) are more 
likely to achieve greater overall coherence.  Such systems have greater accountability, 
given that the need to obtain political support for ideas is built into the patterns of 
interaction.”40  Regardless of their district’s funding, Portland and Nyssa teachers 
recounted positive, effective, curriculum development prompted by the reform because 
the state empowered them to design the details while setting clear expectations through 
common rubrics. 
 
Outcome-Based Reform: “We made it our own” 
Despite their cynicism at times, teachers benefited from designing the Certificate 
of Initial Mastery curriculum because of the common outcomes, language, and rubrics 
they adopted to assess students.  Even art education gained from a CIM makeover.  As 
Nyssa teacher Boyer noted, “Art is seen as a discipline, instead of fluff or an elective.  So 
you’re actually teaching reading, writing, and all those other things that would go with it: 
art criticism, art history, [art production and aesthetics].  I like how they divided it…and 
that we could score it.  The kids could actually show us what they knew how to do 
because it was based on what they knew how to do and what they could perform.”41  This 
focus on outcomes created a common vocabulary for teachers.  Franklin teacher Mateo 
explained, “Back in the days of the CIM and the CAM, the CIM actually was pretty 
                                                
40 Fullan in Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, The Governance of Curriculum: 
1994 Yearbook of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, ed. Richard F. Elmore and 
Susan Fuhrman, Yearbook / Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development 1994 (Alexandria, 
Va: The Association, 1994), 201. 
41 Boyer, Oral History Interview of David Boyer.  In the section previous to the one quoted, Boyer 
mentioned all four learning outcomes for art: art criticism, art history, art production, and aesthetics. 
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helpful.  I think it got a lot of people speaking the same language.  They were standards 
that were being taught on all the grade levels, and as a consequence, even today in 2014, 
I’m pretty much the using 6th grade scoring rubric—the kids know what those things 
entail.”42  In fact, many teachers still use the CIM rubrics. 
Teachers appreciated the collaboration and curriculum alignment the reform 
required.  The principle embedded in the CIM was that teachers produced high quality 
work when they collaborated, and when that collaboration aligned with their values.  
Smith expanded,  
The positive that came out of doing the whole process was that teachers at all 
grade levels got together and looked at what do we teach when and streamlined 
that whole process.  It forced teachers to collaborate more with each other rather 
than each teacher sitting in his own little classroom and doing their thing.  It 
forced grade-level teachers at the elementary and middle school to make sure that 
the same thing happened in each classroom during a year’s time.  It forced 
teachers at the high school level to also seriously look at—okay, if somebody 
takes English, what exactly do we want them to do?  I'm going to say that had not 
happened in the past.  And it forced teachers to talk to each other and not go into 
their class and close the door and doing their own thing because that's what they'd 
been doing for 20 years.  It really opened up communication between colleagues.  
We learned from each other.  It made it easier for the students to then say, it didn't 
matter which teacher I was taking sophomore English from, I still covered the 
same material.  I don't think that was the case in the past.43 
 
Across the state, teachers opened their doors to each other and deliberated about how to 
teach and what students should learn at each level.  Though a school or district could 
accomplish this independently, the Certificate of Initial Mastery encouraged these 
conversations about alignment. 
To assist teachers in this process, the state devoted funds to professional 
development time and collaboration.  These teacher-led sessions evoked positive 
                                                
42 Mateo, Oral History Interview of Manuel Mateo. 
43 Smith, Oral History Interview of Christiane Smith. 
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endorsements from teachers.  Franklin social studies and language arts teacher Childs 
remembered, 
We had more professional development that allowed us to collaborate.  It was 
initially under the guise of CIM, Certificate of Initial Mastery, but we made it our 
own.  It was really about creating good curriculum and sharing it with each other, 
and sharing best practices.  I was the language arts liaison, and we would meet 
once a month and share stuff and then bring it back [to our schools].  Plus we 
would design the [district-wide professional development] workshops during 
these days.  Plus we eventually started having what we called summer camp, 
where we’d scrounge up funding to have a week in the summer where we would 
cross-curricularly develop really great, amazing units and then be able to share 
that stuff…It was all teacher-led, except we had a TOSA, a Teacher on Special 
Assignment…We were trying to get that kind of connected owning going on.44 
 
Teachers found this type of professional development to be useful, relevant, timely, and 
effective.  Teachers enjoyed learning from each other and collaborating to improve their 
own craft.  While aligning the curriculum to sequence which outcomes belonged in which 
class, teachers still retained autonomy to decide how to teach each outcome.  Mateo 
asserted, “I appreciated the academic freedom that I was allowed in the classroom.  There 
were content standards, there were things that needed to be taught, but the way I 
approached them was very, very liberating.”45  This type of teacher-led collaborative 
professional development, born out of the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century, 
proved to be the highlight of teachers’ experience with reform. 
This professional development succeeded because it built upon values that 
teachers already held: collaboration, professionalism, and autonomy.  Conley and 
Goldman’s survey results confirmed this.  They concluded, “States can develop school 
restructuring legislation that teachers will accept if, and perhaps only if, it captures key 
themes that respond to concerns already felt by teachers.”  Conley and Goldman 
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elaborated that reform can be mandated from the top, but unless teachers participate in 
crafting the changes themselves from the bottom, the reform will not translate to the 
classroom.  Teachers “need to be active participants in constructing meaning from the 
reforms presented to them.”  Therefore, to get teacher to buy-in, schools “may need to 
create space for educators to discuss and analyze the purposes and goals of reform and to 
consider its ramifications for them from the perspectives broader than their individual 
classrooms.”46  This professional development succeeded because it allowed teachers to 
develop the reform’s implementation themselves. 
 
Standards-Based Reform: “Everything became standardized instead of standard-
based” 
This positive start to the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century soured in 
1995 after the state revised the focus of the law from educational outcomes to discipline-
driven standards.  While teachers did not object to more specific content-based standards, 
they disliked its implementation.  Whereas, prior to 1995 teachers taught towards 
outcomes using common rubrics, performance based assessments, and portfolios, after 
the revision, the focus shifted toward top-down professional development and testing. 
Standards-based education departed from the top-down bottom-up approach to 
reform despite Conley and Goldman’s warning that teachers must construct their own 
implementation of the reform for it to be successful.  Teachers noticed that outside 
experts began to supplant teacher-led professional development.  Franklin English 
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teacher Mateo recalled, “I started to notice more and more that the professional 
development was not really designed where we were learning from each other but they 
were bringing in outside experts…As it moved further and further away from people who 
were actually teaching, I found it less and less useful.”  Childs emphasized,  
Our days that were professional development and collaborative sort of got taken 
over.  They brought in some people from the outside…to do a lot of top-down 
stuff.  And we had been doing some collaborative…I don’t know how to put it.  
There had been some investment in developing some of the more critical thinking 
social studies curriculum in a coherent way…That all got undone, or co-opted, to 
sort of, mandate.  They actually really wanted us to do everything at the same 
time.47 
 
This not only shifted professional development from a collaborative setting to one of 
direct instruction, it also shifted power from local schools and teachers to the district and 
state.  The state centralized control over the direction of reform and diminished local 
input, contradicting the intention of the original school reform act.  Nyssa experienced a 
similar shift.  Teachers craved time to work with each other rather than listening to 
outside experts.  Smith recalled, “I do think the district spent a lot of money to bring in 
training, but it took teachers time to sit down and develop curriculum.”48  Teachers 
opposed these changes, seeing it as a usurpation of power that kept them from best 
meeting the needs of the students in their classrooms.  As Childs concluded, “Everything 
became standardized instead of standard-based.”49 
The emphasis on standardization reflected a renewed focus on testing.  Oregon 
had long administered standardized tests to students, but after 1995 testing became more 
prominent.  In general, teachers did not object to testing students, as long as the 
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assessments corresponded to their teaching, curriculum, and pedagogy.  But they did 
object to standardized multiple-choice tests that they found irrelevant to the classroom.  
For example, teachers supported the state writing test, which required students to write an 
essay, because those skills already belonged in the language arts curriculum.   Smith 
explained,  
On the whole, it’s not as if the CIM asked the students to do something they had 
not been doing all along…In a language arts class, students have always written.  
They’ve always been graded on it.  I will say, though, having been involved in 
both administering and evaluating the writing samples, that it made me a better 
teacher because it was fairer, more objective to evaluate students' writing because 
you have these set parameters.50   
 
Common standards and rubrics allowed teachers to align expectations of quality for 
students and that benefited teaching and learning.  However, teachers objected to the 
CIM multiple-choice tests.  Ken Dickey, a Nyssa High School science teacher, described 
this transformation. 
I got really excited when CIM and CAM came in…When the CIM first started, 
we were told there would be no CIM tests.  The CIM was going to be this real-
life, project-based learning…The early idea of the CIM is, there would be a 
problem to be solved and there are multiple dimensions that cut across multiple 
disciplines.  You’re oftentimes working in teams to solve the problem.  I was 
really excited about this…It was really disappointing when all that went away.  
“There will be no CIM tests.  It’s all about authentic learning.”  It’s really a test.  
It’s multiple choice.  It’s   A through D was the answer.  That was pretty 
depressing.  When the older teachers said, “Yeah right, we’ll see the pendulum 
swing.”  I was very off put by this attitude, but they turned out to be right.  I don't 
want to be cynical like that; you try to find value in the movements that come.  
But I do resent the “graft,” the money that is taken from districts to go into the 
agents that bring about these changes, go into the superstructure that creates 
standards, go into superstructure that creates assessment, go into the 
superstructure that creates new curriculum, be it textbook, evaluations, or 
whatever.  So I’ve seen enough of that.  In a district like Nyssa, that’s a huge 
amount of money that could otherwise be doing good things in schools.  I know 
there’s a trade off.51 
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After 1995, the CIM transformed from a progressive bottom-up reform to a top-down 
standardized testing platform.  Teachers questioned the merit of this change. 
Teachers took issue with the testing for many reasons.  They bought into the 
CIM’s initial pedagogy of authentic assessment, but multiple-choice tests did not fit into 
that framework.  As English teacher Mateo explained, teachers didn’t find the tests 
relevant to the curriculum or to their students.  
I felt like schools were getting a little bit more restrictive, because in order to have 
a reform effort as was envisioned through the legislation, it required a lot of 
testing.  Some of the tests were these kind of formalized testing vehicles, which 
really had no connection to students’ lives…They were measuring really narrow 
areas…And that's all fine and well, but all of a sudden, it started influencing the 
curriculum, because the curriculum started being more and more designed to 
teach to the test, so to speak.52   
 
This happened in science as well.  Science teacher Dickey objected to the science test 
because it didn’t align with his curriculum.  Therefore, he created a “CIM cram” to 
prepare students for the testing, and spent a number of days literally teaching to the test.   
My problem has always been that I consider certain things as being important to 
science and they’re not represented in the standards.  I still want to teach them.  
I’m not going to drop them because they’re not on the test.  When it comes to the 
test, we created—it didn’t seem very difficult at all—we just created what we 
called “the CIM cram.”  We still teach the CIM cram.  It’s basically three days of 
class where we cram the material that’s going to be on CIM…There's just not that 
much [material]…Because it’s so easy to cram for that test, if you just do it, you 
get everybody off your back.  You get enough passing students, and then you 
don’t have to be distracted by it anymore.53 
 
Dickey saw testing as a distraction: a requirement he and his students must fulfill, but not 
a valuable learning experience.  He also noticed in speaking with other teachers across 
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the state that, as a result of the testing, many had eliminated curricula from their courses 
that did not appear on the test.  He reported that other teachers admitted,  
“We don’t do that anymore because it’s not on the test.”  I was just shocked that 
somebody could not teach electricity because it’s not on the test, not teach about 
machines because it’s not on the test.  It seems horrifying to me, but that’s the 
way it is.  I really think the canon of scientific ideas that have been passed down 
and are represented by all the respectable textbooks is highly worthwhile.  
They’re powerful ideas that apply to so many parts of life.  It’s really a joy to 
share them with students.  I don’t know why I would not do that just because 
someone didn’t put it on the test.54 
 
This narrowing of the curriculum pushed social studies teachers to fight testing.  
In 1998, Bill Bigelow, a Franklin High School social studies teacher, wrote an opinion 
piece in the Sunday Oregonian entitled “Social Studies Tests from Hell.”  He criticized 
the pilot social studies test as “a collection of random multiple choice questions, 
demanding rote memorization and the application of almost no higher level thinking 
skills…Social studies teachers will have to substantially dumb-down our curriculum to 
insure students’ success.”  Bigelow pleaded, “Teachers will have to reorient our curricula 
away from the role plays, simulations, research projects, essay writing, and other in-depth 
activities that breathe life into social studies and allow students to probe beneath the 
surface of ‘the facts.’”  In a later interview, Bigelow acknowledged that he felt a sense of 
betrayal; Vera Katz, the reform’s author, had promised to “reimagine education” and 
connect it to the real world, but the tests this new system produced were “so narrow, so 
small-minded.”55  In many ways, Bigelow was right; the multiple-choice tests created for 
the state by an Illinois test company, Metritech, Inc., did not satisfy the criteria of the 
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performance-based assessments promised by the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st 
Century.56 
In his Oregonian opinion piece, Bigelow included specific multiple-choice 
questions from the pilot test and critiqued their purpose.  For example, one question 
asked which Constitutional Amendment gave women the right to vote, but “said almost 
nothing else about the movement that resulted in the Amendment.”  Bigelow explained 
that his students had studied “the long struggle for women’s rights.  However, unless they 
could recall that one isolated fact—that it was the 19th and not the 16th, 17th, or 18th 
Amendment (the other test choices) that gave women the vote—the state of Oregon 
would have considered all their extensive knowledge irrelevant.”  Bigelow concluded, 
“The Oregon Department of Education is about to inaugurate tests that will hurt 
education.” 57 
Bigelow’s article set off a firestorm.  The Oregonian ran numerous letters to the 
editor and other op-ed essays supporting Bigelow’s critique.  Meanwhile, state 
superintendent Paulus attempted to silence the teacher for drawing attention to the tests.  
Paulus began an investigation into who leaked the pilot test to Bigelow, and sent a letter 
to the state Teacher Standards and Practices Commission stating that, while Bigelow may 
“express his concerns,” he may not publish test materials.  She then phoned the PPS 
superintendent and demanded Bigelow be fired.58  From Bigelow’s perspective, 
“Oregon’s response highlighted a basic contradiction: high-stakes testing requires 
                                                
56 Steven Carter and Scott Learn, “History Tests Stir Talk of Revolt,” The Oregonian, January 12, 1999, 
Sunrise edition. 
57 Bill Bigelow, “Social Studies Tests from Hell,” The Oregonian, December 6, 1998, Sunday edition, sec. 
Opinion. 
58 Bill Bigelow, “Testing Against Democracy,” Rethinking Schools, Spring 1999, 
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government-enforced secrecy; democracy requires unfettered discussion by 
knowledgeable participants.”59  About a month after the controversy began, Barbara 
Wolfe, the state assessment coordinator, conceded the superficiality of some of the social 
studies test questions.60  
Despite unsuccessful efforts to silence Bigelow, the criticisms embarrassed the 
Oregon Department of Education and led it to postpone the social studies tests 
indefinitely.61  However, that too came with a trade off.  Franklin social studies teacher 
Childs contended, “We fought the social studies multiple choice test, that would have 
been restrictive.  But we did feel hampered, in the fact that we knew that if social studies 
wasn’t tested, it wouldn’t be as emphasized.”62  Overall, teachers responded negatively to 
testing because it narrowed the curriculum, took away time from teaching, felt irrelevant 
to students, and did not create an authentic opportunity for assessment. 
In addition to a narrowed curriculum within core classes, teachers also objected to 
the elimination of electives and vocational education programs for students.  Few could 
miss the irony that the Certificate of Advanced Mastery promoted student career 
exploration through its six pathways while districts eliminated the very elective and 
vocational classes that might have naturally fit into the CAM structure.  Some of this 
occurred as a result of budget cuts, although the reform’s emphasis on standardization 
was the primary cause.  Smith described why this occurred in Nyssa.   
The CIM and the CAM, at least here in Nyssa, did mean in order to have the 
students perform better on that, we asked them to take more remedial classes in 
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order to pass those state tests.  That meant they could not take electives and that 
meant we had to cut out all the elective programs.  When I look at the amount of 
electives students were allowed to take when I started teaching here compared to 
now, it’s really kind of sad that so many electives have been cancelled, 
particularly in the vocational area.  That has not necessarily been a positive for 
quite a large number of the students.63 
 
Dickey described in detail Nyssa’s reductions.  “When I arrived, we had a full-
time metal shop teacher, we had a full-time wood shop teacher, we had a full-time 
ag[riculture] teacher, a full-time choir teacher and a full-time band teacher.  There are a 
lot of justifications for the change [the reduction of these positions], but…I think the 
standards are an overarching explanation for that.”64  Portland experienced a similar 
reduction in electives and vocational education.  Hawkins, a Franklin business teacher, 
described that, at the beginning of the decade, Franklin had five business teachers, but by 
the end of the decade, it was down to one, herself.  She taught six courses instead of the 
standard five in order to maintain a full program.  When asked why that happened, she 
explained, “Budget cuts.  Personal finance was no longer required.  Electives were no 
longer required…They just kept cutting.  They wouldn’t replace electives with budget 
issues.”65  While Nyssa’s reduction resulted primarily from changes in the curriculum, 
the reductions in Portland compounded because of lack of funding.  Standardization led 
to fewer elective and vocational offerings for students. 
This outcome paralleled what happened in California following its property tax 
limitation and new emphasis on basic skills during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In an 
analysis of the eight largest urban school districts in California, education professor 
James Catterall, and his graduate student Emily Brizendine, found that when districts 
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determined which courses to offer in an environment of financial constriction and new 
state school reform testing, they narrowed the curriculum by prioritizing some courses 
and treating others as expendable.  In general, California districts trimmed “frill” 
courses—electives, upper level courses, and arts and industrial courses—while increasing 
support courses for state testing.  Teachers in Oregon described the same pattern: districts 
reduced elective and vocational programs while expanding remedial courses.  Catterall 
and Brizendine also discovered that, although districts made these decisions individually, 
“trimming school districts toward the bone resulted in comparable skeletons.”  The 
researchers attributed this uniformity to three causes: “the centralizing effect of 
Proposition 13 on the state’s school finance system, the unifying influence of California’s 
state-level requirement for proficiency testing for high school graduation, and the 
common structural constraints faced by districts as they made decisions in 
retrenchment.”66  In Oregon, Measure 5 and the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st 
Century produced similar results: centralized funding at the state level, state standardized 
testing requirements, and the constrained options districts could choose to satisfy both 
conditions.  Consequently, by the end of the 1990s, public school curriculum in Oregon 
schools had become uniform. 
Teachers rejected this narrowing of the curriculum.  This rejection came from all 
subject areas, not just elective and vocational teachers.  They believed that the purpose of 
school was greater than simply passing standardized tests in core subjects such as 
English, social studies, math, and science.  Teachers valued electives and vocational 
courses that allowed students to explore, experiment, and experience new things.  Nyssa 
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teacher Smith observed,  
Personally, I do not feel a high school education should only prepare you for a 
career.  In high school you should have opportunities to experience, to try out all 
kinds of areas.  If you don't have opportunities to take electives, you will not do 
that.  Maybe you will never take an art class or take a music class or take a 
cooking class or a sewing class, because you have to take the math and the 
science and the languages and so on.  I really think high school to me is exposure 
to a lot of opportunities and if you're not exposed to them, you might never pursue 
them later on.67 
 
Similarly, Franklin teacher Hawkins charged,  
I really believe firmly that vocational education is an important role.  I believe 
high school is the last time education is free for kids.  They should have the 
opportunity to try an accounting class or try a welding class or a forestry class or a 
health occupations class.  …I think we are doing a disservice now to our students 
when we cut all those classes, for they are not having the opportunity to explore 
them…I think it's crucial for them to have a taste of this, to actually experience 
it.68 
 
Teachers believed in school as an educational institution, not a test-prep center, that 
school is practical but also nurturing.  Teachers wanted students to be able to try new 
things and stumble, and to uncover hidden passions.  As Mateo stated, “I am not here to 
educate a workforce, to prepare them for the world of work.  I am here to educate a 
human being to have a life, and to be a human being.”69 
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Epilogue 
 
The combination of the tax revolt and school reform set Oregon on a pathway that 
continues to this day.  Structures set in place in the 1990s still influence teachers’ work: 
an unstable tax structure, standardized uniform reforms, and testing.  These seeds planted 
in the 1990s have created the school system Oregonians know today.   
The economic collapse of 2008 uncloaked the effects of an unstable tax structure 
hidden in the 1990s, relying primarily on income taxes to fund schools.  As a result of the 
Great Recession, the state found itself without money to maintain the current school 
funding level.  Districts had no choice but to cut.  Teachers who remembered increasing 
class sizes during the 1990s, noted that, by today’s standards, 1990s class sizes would be 
considered small.  Franklin teacher Childs explained that she held a discussion with her 
class this year (2014) around growing testing and class size.  She explained that, while 
her students attempted to argue both sides, they couldn’t even comprehend an alternate 
system, because they’ve lived this one since kindergarten.   
[My students] struggle.  Because, there’s a part of them that, you know, this is 
how it is, and we understand that this is cheaper than that, and we don’t have 
enough money for this.  And if we took all the money that’s put into evaluation 
and put it into smaller class sizes and mentorship and real-world learning then 
they we would be learning our non-cognitive skills which would allow us to be 
more successful both in college and career.  So they get all of it, but they also 
know that they’re in the real world…What was really hard to make them 
understand was that this isn’t how it’s always been.  I mean, I realized as I began 
the unit, when we were talking, that they just had no vision of anything else.1 
 
Standardized testing also experienced this amplification effect from its 1990s 
origin.  While standardized testing increased in the 1990s, it was used as an indicator to 
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inform teaching, not as a high stakes bar on which grade level promotion depended.  
Testing became the only significant indicator for success under President George W. 
Bush’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB).  Though the state has moved away from NCLB 
under President Obama, in 2011 the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 290, which 
aimed to tie teacher evaluations to test scores.2  Now, not only do students’ graduation 
depend upon standardized testing, the measure of teachers’ success relies upon their 
ability to prepare students for these tests.  So, while the “CIM cram”3 may have sufficed 
during the 1990s, today testing determines the curriculum directly. 
Furthermore, reform today has moved towards a uniform national curriculum, the 
Common Core State Standards.  Though not developed as a national curriculum, over 40 
states have adopted the Common Core in order to exempt themselves from No Child Left 
Behind.  Unlike the teacher involvement in the initial implementation of the Oregon 
Educational Act for the 21st Century, the developers of the Common Core involved 
university professors and others with ties to testing companies, not teachers with 
knowledge of K-12 aged students.4  Instead of top-down, bottom-up, it is simply top-
down.  Not surprisingly, many teachers have reacted negatively and have been slow to 
adopt the incoming changes.  They’ve criticized the creation, the age-appropriateness, the 
emphasis on testing, and the implementation of the standards.  Even so, teachers in 
Oregon will be expected to teach to the new Common Core standards and tests beginning 
next school year (2014-15).  Mateo critiqued these standards as such: 
                                                
2 Senate Interim Committee on Education and General Government, Senate Bill 290, Chapter 729, 2011 
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These national standards, which we now call the Common Core State Standards, 
which 43 states have signed on to…I'm an educated person; I've read those things, 
43 standards in language arts.  Some of them are written in such a way, that in 
fact they are confusing to an educated person who is intended to teach these 
things.  And what I believe has happened is they’ve elevated language or 
compacted some concepts into these little boxes that we’re expected to have 
students master, that I’m sorry, [are inappropriate for students at that grade level.]  
And then there’s the connection, well if the third grader’s not really doing it well, 
it jeopardizes the job of the teacher who’s really there, whose heart is more 
towards the kids, not towards the test scores.5 
 
Veteran educator Stan Karp noted that these standards would hurt the most vulnerable 
students the most.  “If a child struggles to clear the high bar at 5 feet, she will not become 
a ‘world-class’ jumper because someone raised the bar to 6 feet and yelled ‘jump higher,’ 
or if her ‘poor’ performance is used to punish her coach.”6  Unlike the period from 1991-
1995, when teachers used professional development time to collaboratively design 
curriculum to meet state outcomes, today’s Common Core leaves teachers out of the 
equation, other than for reprimand.  Consequently, although teachers still support 
rigorous expectations for all students, they struggle to implement Common Core.7 
Education historian Diane Ravitch, once a proponent of standards and testing, has 
now renounced the very movement she helped propel.  Ravitch served as Assistant 
Secretary of Education in President George H.W. Bush’s administration and became a 
leader of the standards movement.  In fact, her history of school reform, published in 
1995, which examined the origins of the standards movement and its conflict with 
outcome-based education, National Standards in American Education: A Citizen’s Guide, 
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demonstrates her once deep-felt beliefs.  However, her 2010 book, The Death and Life of 
the Great American School System, explains Ravitch’s turnabout.  
Like many others in that era, I was attracted to the idea that the market would 
unleash innovation and bring great efficiencies to education…[Corporate 
reformers] think they can fix education by applying the principles of business, 
organization, management, law and marketing and by developing a good data-
collection system that provides the information necessary to incentivize the 
workforce—principals, teachers, and students—with appropriate rewards and 
sanctions…[but] the effort to upend American public education and replace it 
with something market-based began to feel too radical for me.  I concluded that I 
could not countenance any reforms that might have the effect—intended or 
unintended—of undermining public education.”8 
 
Instead, she has now come to realize,  “It is time, I think, for those who want to improve 
our schools to focus on the essentials of education.  We must make sure that our schools 
have a strong, coherent, explicit curriculum that is grounded in the liberal arts and 
sciences, with plenty of opportunity for children to engage in activities and projects that 
make learning lively…I hope it is not too late.”9  The oral history interviews with 
teachers in Portland and Nyssa indicate that they too believe in this goal and dismiss 
market-based solutions. 
An unstable tax structure, high stakes testing, and top-down national standards 
has damaged education in Oregon and the United States.  For teachers and students alike, 
there is often no way to win in this new education game.  Additionally, as class size (and 
in turn teachers’ workloads) has risen because of financial constraints, and the influence 
of unions has diminished, the voices of teachers advocating for a better public education 
system have been muffled.  The stifling of these voices has opened avenues for the 
privatization of public education through charter schools.  Consequently, yet another 
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aspect of those seeds planted in the 1990s has come to fruition, the influence of business 
on education.  Today we approach a crossroads where, as a nation, we will be forced to 
determine what we expect from our school system: equity of access and quality, or a 
system of winners and losers where the losers will not reach graduation.  As America’s 
Choice first put in in 1990, “Americans are unwittingly making a choice.  It is a choice 
that most of us would probably not make were we aware of its consequences.  Yet every 
day, that choice is becoming more difficult to reverse.”10 
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Appendix: Oral History Interview Participants 
 
The following individuals participated in oral history interviews that I completed 
in the spring of 2014 in accordance with the Oral History Association guidelines and after 
approval from the Portland State University Institutional Review Board.1  I selected these 
individuals because they taught in Nyssa High School or Franklin High School during the 
1990s.  While Nyssa High School remains the sole high school in Nyssa School District, 
I chose Franklin High School because its student demographics best match the district as 
a whole.   
The participants in this oral history project represent a sampling of disciplines, 
ages, and backgrounds.  I recruited participants initially through recommendations from 
teachers in the district, but after initial pre-interviews, I recruited additional participants 
using theoretical sampling.  In other words, I identified holes in the data and recruited 
additional interviewees to fill the gaps.  For example, after realizing that most of my 
Nyssa teachers had been hired with the increased funding from Measure 5, I included a 
retired teacher that had worked in the district for a decade prior to Measure 5 and could 
speak to the changes from the 1980s to the 1990s.  In total, I conducted formal oral 
history interviews with three Franklin teachers, three Nyssa teachers, and the former 
superintendent of Nyssa School District. 
Full audio recordings and transcripts of the oral history interview are available in 
the Portland State University Special Collections Library. 
 
                                                
1 “Principles and Best Practices,” Oral History Association, accessed June 13, 2014, 
http://www.oralhistory.org/about/principles-and-practices/. 
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David Boyer, born in Ipswich, England in 1962 to an American military family, grew up 
mostly in the Seattle area, where he graduated from Evergreen High School in 1981.  
After his church mission from 1982-84 to London, England, Boyer eventually earned his 
Associates Degree from Ricks College in 1989, before graduating from BYU Provo with 
his BFA in 1991 and teaching certificate in 1992.  Boyer was hired to teach Art at Nyssa 
High School and Nyssa Middle School in 1992 where, at the time of the interview in 
2014, he continues to teach today. 
 
Sandra Childs, born in Los Angeles in 1961, graduated from Reed College in 1983 and 
SUNY Buffalo School of Law in 1988.  After practicing law for a few years, Childs 
decided instead to become a teacher and completed her MAT from Lewis and Clark 
College in 1991.  Childs was hired at Franklin High School in 1991 to teach Language 
Arts and Social Studies.  She has also held positions as Literacy Instructional Coach and 
Librarian.  At the time of the interview in 2014, she continued to teach Social Studies at 
Franklin High School. 
 
Ken Dickey, born in Mountain View, California in 1963, grew up in South San Diego.  
He graduated from Loma Linda University with a BS in Chemistry in 1985, before 
completing his California Clear Credential at UC Riverside in 1986.  After earning his 
PhD from UC Riverside in 1993 in Philosophy, Dickey was hired to teach Chemistry at 
Nyssa High School in 1993.  At the time of the interview in 2014, Dickey teaches science 
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at Nyssa High School, as well as teaches adjunct courses in Philosophy at Boise State 
University and community college in nearby Boise. 
 
Theresa Hawkins, born in Portland in 1957, graduated from Oregon State University 
with a BS in Business Education in 1979, and went on to earn an MA in Vocational 
Education from OSU in 1984.  Hawkins was hired to teach Business at Franklin High 
School in 1979 and has taught there for the past thirty-five years.  During her time at 
Franklin, the business department has fluctuated from nine teachers in 1979 to one 
teacher by the end of the 1990s, and back up to three business teachers today.  Hawkins 
planned to retire in June 2014. 
 
Manuel Mateo, born in New York in 1954 to immigrant parents from the Dominican 
Republic, graduated from CUNY in 1983, with a BA in English and a minor in education.  
Mateo taught Special Education and Language Arts at Park West High School in New 
York City from 1984-88, when he and his wife moved to Portland, OR.  Mateo taught 
Language Arts at Franklin High School in Portland Public Schools from 1989-2003.  At 
the time of the interview in 2014, Mateo continues to teach at Wilson High School. 
 
Dennis Savage, born in 1940 in Nyssa, Oregon, attended Nyssa High School before 
graduating from Eastern Oregon University in 1965 with a BS in Education.  After 
teaching at Helens Stack Middle School in Baker, Washington from 1966-67, Savage was 
hired to teach Science, Physical Education, and coach at Nyssa Middle School in 1967.  
Savage became the principal of Nyssa Elementary School from 1974-84, and then 
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superintendent of Nyssa School District from 1986-2000.  In 2000, Savage took the 
superintendent position at a smaller district, Harper, from which he retired in 2008.  At 
the time of the interview in 2014, Savage continues to live in Nyssa. 
 
Christiane Smith, born in 1944 in Friedland, Germany, grew up in West Berlin, and 
graduated from University of Mainz with a degree as an English translator in 1966.  After 
marrying an American and immigrating to the United States, Smith earned a BA in 
Secondary Education from Central Washington University and a credential to teach 
Language Arts and German in 1976.  Smith taught in Mansfield, Washington for three 
years before moving to Nyssa, Oregon to teach Language Arts, German, and French at 
Nyssa High School in 1979.  She taught there until she retired in 2002.  At the time of the 
interview in 2014, Smith continues to live in Nyssa, Oregon. 
